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A Great Invisible Crashing: The Rise
and Fall of Patent Eligibility Through
Mayo v. Prometheus
N. Scott Pierce
Despite its apparent simplicity, satisfaction of the statutory
threshold for patent eligibility in the United States has become
increasingly uncertain and, recently, almost impossible to predict
in some fields. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the
existence of the many lower-court tests for patent eligibility that
have evolved, and has even encouraged the development of
additional tests. Behind all of these tests, however, is a
fundamental premise dating back to English common law that
limits patentable subject matter to the physical application of a
naturally-occurring principle. In Mayo v. Prometheus, the
Supreme Court effectively supplanted all previous criteria for
patent eligibility with a requirement that any application of the
laws of nature, naturally-occurring physical phenomena or
abstract ideas be “inventive,” thereby hopelessly confusing
satisfaction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 with requirements for patentability
under other sections of the statute. Mayo, in short, annihilates the
last vestiges of any rational attempt to distinguish patent eligibility
from patentability. By failing to separately define “inventive”
beyond its meaning under those other portions of the statute, the
Court severely undermines the predictability upon which the
economic benefits of patent law depends.


Principal, Hamilton Brook Smith & Reynolds, Concord, MA; Adjunct Professor at
Suffolk University Law School. He can be reached at (978) 341-0036 and at
scott.pierce@HBSR.com. The author is solely responsible for the views of this article,
which do not necessarily represent those of his Firm, or any client or organization.
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[I]t will be a spectacle: the fall of a crystal palace.
But coming down in total blackout, without one
glint of light, only great invisible crashing.
—Thomas Pynchon1
INTRODUCTION
Title 35 of the United States Code provides the standard for
patent eligibility in section 101, providing that “[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”2 Despite its apparent simplicity, proper
application of this statutory provision requires an understanding of
the history of patent eligibility, beginning with its roots in England.
“Letters of protection” began in England as a way to encourage
foreign craftsmen to immigrate to England and bring their skills
with them.3 A patent could be obtained under English “patent
custom” for technology that was new to the realm—even if
previously known elsewhere—so long as the imported technology
on which it was based did not deleteriously affect employment.4
Further, the patentee was obligated to practice the invention upon
pain of revocation of the patent.5
As the scope of protection expanded beyond imported
manufactures and the threat of competition with existing
technology became more apparent, the requirement to practice an
invention in exchange for an exclusive right was displaced by a
requirement to put the public in possession of the invention.6 Early
1

THOMAS PYNCHON, GRAVITY’S RAINBOW 1(Penguin Press 2012) (1973).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
3
CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, 10 (1988).
4
Id. at 12–13.
5
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 857 (1994).
6
See Liardet v. Johnson, (1788) 1 Web. P.C. 53 (K.B.); 1 Carp. 35 (“The meaning of
the specification is, that others may be taught to do the thing for which the patent is
granted; and if the specification is false, the patent is void, for after the term the public
ought to have the benefit of the discovery.”); see also H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM
2
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fears that patent protection might be overly broad or granted too
readily and for slight improvements only reinforced the country’s
need for an adequate description of the invention and the necessity
of having a means by which to “recognize innovations.”7 By the
late eighteenth century, at about the time the first patent acts in the
United States were being drafted and enacted, both products
themselves and the processes for their manufacture and use were
becoming viewed in England as applications of naturally-occurring
principles.8 American courts generally followed suit, as will be
seen.9
Over the last two hundred years, technological changes have
forced courts to struggle not only with patentable distinction, but
also with the scope of patent eligibility. In doing so, a wide variety
of tests have been developed—particularly over the last one
hundred years—that have tended to obscure the original premise
that patent eligibility must flow from the physical application of a
naturally-occurring principle. Even in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision regarding the scope of patentable subject matter, Bilski v.
Kappos,10 there is little to guide the public in distinguishing
between “an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process [that] may well be
deserving of patent protection”11 and limitation of “an abstract idea
to one field of use or adding token post-solution components [that]
did not make the concept patentable,”12 both of which were
invoked by the Court in holding that a claimed method of hedging
risk “would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and would
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”13 Federal
AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1852, 75 (1984)
(quoting E. Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and
Present, 13 L. Q. Rev. 313, 317–318 (1897)) (“Lord Mansfield concluded that ‘the
doctrine of the instruction of the public by means of the personal effects and supervision
of the grantee was definitely and finally laid aside [in Liardet v. Johnson] in favor of the
novel theory that this function belongs to the patent specification.’”).
7
See MACLEOD, supra note 3 at 51–55.
8
See, e.g., Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.); 8 T.R. 95.
9
See infra Part I.B.
10
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
11
Id. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)).
12
Id. at 3231.
13
Id.
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Circuit cases that have issued since Bilski and the Supreme Court’s
apparent encouragement to lower courts to continue to develop
new tests of patent eligibility reflect a continuing potential for
confusion.
The origin of all of the tests that have been developed to date
can be traced to the idea of the physical application of a naturallyoccurring principle. However, links between these tests and this
underlying premise have become sporadic and circumstantial. For
example, a growing tendency among courts to confuse patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with patentability under other
sections of the statute—such as novelty,14 nonobviousness15 and
even enablement16—has led to calls to forego application of tests
for patent eligibility except as a last resort.17 The recent decision
by the Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.18 has rendered superfluous all tests
developed by the lower courts for determining patent eligibility
under section 101 by grounding patent eligibility in “inventive
application” and “inventive concept.”19 As applied by the Court in
Mayo, statutory eligibility is a function of the “creative value of the

14

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
16
See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
17
See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
In the case before us, for all these reasons the proper course of action
is the one that the trial court and the panel majority has followed:
decide the case on the question of compliance with §§ 102 and 103 as
Congress has instructed, and decline the dissent’s invitation to put the
parties and this court in the swamp that is § 101 jurisprudence.
Id. at 1262; see also Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently PostBilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673
(2010).
We take a different approach; rather than try to cut through the
complexity of Bilski, or predict how it will be applied, we talk about
how to avoid it. . . . We propose that the § 101 issue of Bilski be
considered only when doing so is absolutely necessary to determine
the validity of a claim or claims in a patent.
Id.at 1673.
18
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
19
See id. at 1299.
15
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discovery”20 that is intended to somehow “balance . . .
considerations [that] may differ from one field to another.”21
The idea that the physical application of a naturally-occurring
principle is the underlying criterion for patent eligibility is a
linchpin of patent law; failure to abide by it will result in
uncertainty as to whether newly developed technologies will meet
the threshold requirement of patent eligibility as a “process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof.”22 Moreover, abandonment of the
application-of-principle standard will dangerously expand the
potential scope of exclusionary rights into areas that may hinder
economic growth.
Part I of this Article charts the rise of physical application of
naturally-occurring principle as a threshold for patent eligibility,
beginning with the first English patents, and following the
development of this doctrine in the United States under the early
Patent Acts. In Part II, the fall of physical application of naturallyoccurring principle as a threshold is charted through to the
Supreme Court decision of Bilski v. Kappos and its immediate
aftermath. Part III argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Mayo v. Prometheus completes the fall, predicating an ensuing
unpredictability in statutory eligibility that will undermine the
patent system as we know it and may, ultimately, lead to
diminished reliance on patents as a means for advancement of
economic development.
I. THE RISE OF APPLICATION OF NATURALLY-OCCURRING
PRINCIPLE AS A THRESHOLD FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A. Early Patent Protection in England
In the fourteenth century, during the reign of Edward III, nonexclusive “letters of protection” were granted to foreign craftsmen
for the purpose of “encouraging them to settle in England and to

20
21
22

Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1305.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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transmit their skills to native apprentices.”23 Later, during the
middle of the sixteenth century, exclusive protection was
introduced for the same purpose.24 However, an exclusive right
would be granted only if it would not harm existing industries.25
Further, “inventions” had to be practiced—under penalty of
revocation.26 These policies eventually eroded, so that by the end
of the sixteenth century monopolies were often granted on the
basis of influence, and without reference to importation.27 As a
result of dissatisfaction with “abuse of the royal prerogative,”
many such patents were revoked in 1601 and, again, under King
James I in 1621, culminating in the Statute of Monopolies in
1624.28
The Statute of Monopolies declared void most monopolies
granted by royal prerogative.29 Exempted from the statute were
any letters patent and grants of privilege for the
term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be
made, of the sole working or making of any manner
of new manufactures within this realm, to the true
and first inventor and inventors of such
manufactures, which others at the time of making
such letters patent and grants shall not use.30
Sir Edward Coke, who had introduced the predecessor to the
bill of 1624 in 1621, and participated in consideration of the bill of
1624, understood the term “inventor” to embrace importers of
“manufactures”31 and considered novelty to be only a function of
whether the subject matter was actually being used in England at

23

MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 10.
Id.
25
See id.at 13 (“Employment was sacrosanct, and the inventor who threatened it was
denied official recognition and protection by patent.”).
26
See id.at 12.
27
See id.at 14.
28
See id.at 14–15.
29
See Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6.
30
Id.
31
See MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 18 (“[Coke] followed Elizabethan practice in
understanding ‘inventor’ to include the importers of manufactures and technical
devices.”).
24
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the time a patent was applied for.32 Absolute novelty was not
material. Both of these interpretations were consistent with earlier
attempts to promote the immigration of skilled artisans in order to
introduce new technology to England.33
Although the question of what, in fact, constituted a
manufacture was not one that Coke considered to be difficult,34 nor
one that appears to be squarely addressed until the case of Boulton
v. Bull in 1795,35 a number of cases appeared to shift the eligibility
and scope of protection afforded by patent grant. For example, as
described by MacLeod, a patent sought by Benjamin Lund and
Francis Hawksbee in 1727 was challenged by the Company of
Copper Miners of England on the basis that each refinery “goes
upon the same principles in refining, yet scarce any two exactly
pursue the same method and form in practice.”36 The patent was
granted because the petitioners, Lund and Hawksbee, only applied
for a patent for making brass “in a particular furnace, which had
never been used before, without pots.”37
A similar result occurred in Morris v. Bramsom in 1776,38 in
which the patent that issued was upheld following an enquiry by
the jury to the effect that, if the only objection to the patent were
on the basis of it being an addition to an old machine, “that
objection would go to repeal almost every patent that was ever
granted.”39 Following Morris, it was generally considered that a
patent of addition can be good but “it must be for the addition only,
and not for the old machine too.”40 Another case, Liardet v.
Johnson,41 required that a specification enable one skilled in the
32
See id. (“Similarly, it was not a question of whether the manufacture or device
concerned had ever been used in England before, but whether it was in use at the time the
patent was applied for.”).
33
See supra text accompanying note 23.
34
See id. (“‘[I]t must be granted to the first and true inventor,’ and . . . ‘it must be of
such manufacture, which any other at the making of such letters patent did not use.’
Coke did not anticipate any difficulties in the interpretation of these clauses.”).
35
Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 463.
36
See MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 51.
37
Id. at 51–52.
38
Morris v. Bramsom, (1776) 1 Carp. 30 (K.B.).
39
Id. (quoting Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 664).
40
Id. (quoting Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 664).
41
Liardet v. Johnson, (1788) 1 Web. P.C. 53 (K.B.); 1 Carp. 35.
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relevant art or trade to practice the invention without undue
experimentation and consequently, as stated by MacLeod, “[f]or
the first time, the recognized quid pro quo for the award of a patent
was the disclosure of the invention.”42
We can see from these cases the seeds of modern patent law.
Specifically, novelty became a substitute for importation and lack
of interference with an existing industry, and the enabling role of
the description of a patented invention replaced the earlier
requirement to work the invention as the price for obtaining
exclusionary rights. The question remained, however, of what
constituted the scope of a “manufacture” under section 6 of the
Statute of Monopolies. The answer to that question would come
toward the end of the eighteenth century in the context of a
standard that would allow both novelty in application of principle
and adequacy of specification to replace the previous requirements
of importation and practice of the invention.
In 1769, James Watt obtained a patent directed to an
improvement on a steam engine. Watt followed the advice of his
friend, William Small, to not include in his patent specification
“drawings nor descriptions of any particular machinery, but [to]
specify in the clearest manner that you have discovered some
principles.”43 Watt’s invention was directed to an improvement of
the Newcomen steam or “fire” engine.44 The employment of a
separate condenser to draw steam made it no longer necessary to

42

MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 49; see also Turner v. Winter, (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1274
(K.B.) 1276; 1 T. R. 602 (“[I]t is sufficient if persons of skill can understand the process
by means of the specification,” and that “a man of science may be able to produce the
thing intended without the necessity of trying experiments.”); DUTTON, supra note 6, at
75.
[I]n King v. Arkwright (1785), [Buller, J.] held . . . “the end and
meaning of the specification is to teach the public after the term for
which the patent is granted what the art is, and it must put the public
in possession of the secret in as ample and beneficial way as the
patentee himself uses it.”
Id.
43
JENNY UGLOW, THE LUNAR MEN 243 (2002).
44
See id. at 101.
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condense vapor in the cylinder containing the piston, thereby
significantly improving the engine’s efficiency.45
Watt’s patent was tested in Boulton v. Bull, which was heard in
the Court of Common Pleas in 1795.46 The defendants challenged
the validity of the patent by arguing that a patent cannot consist
merely of principles, but must, rather, be “embodied and reduced
into practice.”47 Otherwise, “like the sentiments of an author,
while in his own mind . . . they are alike the property of him, or of
another.”48 The patent was invalid, according to the defendants,
because the invention was an improvement and because the
specification did not “correspond with it,” since the patent was for
“mere principles, which . . . cannot be the subject of a patent.”49
The plaintiffs countered that the patent was directed to “a new
invented method of lessening the consumption of steam and fuel in
fire engines,” and that the specification “states both the principle of
the invention, and also the mode in which it is to operate.”50 The
“difference in the terms used in the patent and the specification,”
namely the “method” and “principle of the invention,” as stated by
the plaintiffs, “arises from the nature of the subject, but the real
meaning of them is the same.”51 In essence, then, the method was
the application of principle of the invention. The plaintiffs argued
that the patent directed to the method should be upheld, despite the
fact that a right is given to the whole machine by employment of
the method:

45

See id.; see also WILLIAM ROSEN, THE MOST POWERFUL IDEA IN THE WORLD 104–06
(2010).
46
The original patent was set to expire in 1783, but, by an Act of Parliament, the FireEngine Act of 1775, the patent was extended for twenty-five years. See id. at 162–63.
47
Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. at 656.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 658. As stated by the defendants:
Upon the whole therefore of the case, it appears either that the patent
is for an entire formed machine, when it ought to have been for an
improvement only, and in which case the specification does not
correspond with it, or it is for mere principles, which, according to
the stat. 21 Jac. 1 c. 3, cannot be the subject of a patent.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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Where an improvement is made upon a machine
already known, the patent ought not to be the
machine itself, but for the method of improving it . .
. . [I]f from the nature of the thing a patent for the
new method or improvement only should have the
effect of giving a right to the whole machine, that is
not of itself a ground on which the patent can be set
aside.52
Two of the four judges held the subject matter to be within the
Statute of Monopolies and the specification to sufficiently describe
the invention, despite the lack of description of any particular
machinery for carrying it out.53
Four years after Boulton v. Bull, however, in Hornblower v.
Boulton the King’s Bench did not have any difficulty in
unanimously finding the improvement represented by that same
patent to be eligible subject matter.54 The questions previously
addressed by the Court of Common Pleas were reflected in the
defendants’ four arguments on appeal, namely, first, that section 6
of the Statute of Monopolies provides for patentability of “a
formed machine;” second, that Watt’s improvement “could not be
considered as a patent for such a machine;” third, that “the
specification did not contain sufficient description of a machine;”
and fourth, that Watt had taken a patent “for the whole, when it
ought to have been for an addition only.”55 The arguments were
addressed as two questions: whether Watt’s improvement was a
patent for mere principles and not for a new manufacture, and, if a
manufacture, whether the specification provided an adequate
description.56
The court found in Watt’s favor.57 Lord Chief Justice Kenyon
found that answer to be self-evident.58 Justice Ashhurst agreed,
52

Id.
See id. at 477–500.
54
Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.); 8 T.R. 95.
55
Id. at 1287.
56
See id. at 1288.
57
See id. at 1288–92.
58
Id. at 1288 (“[I]t evidently appears that the patentee claims a monopoly for an
engine or machine, composed of material parts, which are to produce the effect
53
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seeming to imply that adequate description of the nature of the
invention was itself sufficient to secure the patent.59 Justice Grose
showed how a sufficiently detailed specification might, by
enabling others to work the invention, replace the requirement that
the patentee himself work the invention.60 Likewise, Judge
Lawrence relied on the specification to resolve the apparent
discrepancy between principles and manufacture:
In order to see what the invention was, it is
necessary to refer to the specification; that states
what the invention is, and that the method consists
in certain principles, as they are called, which are
described in the specification. . . . Engine and
method mean the same thing, and may be the
subject of a patent. “Method,” properly speaking, is
only placing several things and performing several
operations in the most convenient order; but it may
signify a contrivance or device; so may an engine,
and there I think it may answer the word “method.”
So “principle” may mean a mere elementary truth,
but it may also mean constituent parts; and in effect
the specification is this: “The contrivance by which
I lessen the consumption of steam consists in the
following principles, that is, constituent or
elementary parts . . . . That is the description of the
thing put into different language.
. . . If this be so, it only remains to be considered,
whether or not, for the improvement of fire engines,
Watt has, with sufficient accuracy, stated a definite
alteration or addition which may be made in all fire

described; and that the mode of producing this is so described as to enable mechanics to
produce it.”).
59
Id. (“[T]he inventor had by his specification particularly described the nature of his
invention, and the manner in which it was to be performed; and having thus complied
with the terms of his patent, I think he is, in point of law as well as justice, entitled to the
benefit which the patent and the Act of Parliament intended to confer on him.”)
60
Id. at 1290 (“[T]he patent is not merely for principles, nor does the specification
describe principles only. The patent states the principles on which the inventor proceeds,
and shows in his specification the manufacture by means of which those principles are to
take effect.”).
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engines, in such a way as to enable a workman to
execute it? And it seems to me that he has.61
Regarding whether or not a patent could be granted for an
addition to previously known matter, Justice Grose made short
work of the contention that it could not:
If indeed a patent could not be granted for an
addition, it would be depriving the public of one of
the best benefits of the Statute of James. Lord
Coke’s opinion therefore seems to have been
formed without due consideration; and modern
experience shows that it is not well founded. . . .
[T]he engines secured to the patentee are such as
are improved in the manner stated in the
specification, and not the original fire engines. . . .62
Therefore, absolute novelty in application of principle on the
one hand, and adequacy of specification on the other operated
together in Hornblower v. Boulton to define an invention under the
Statute of Monopolies, thereby providing alternatives to the
previous requirements of importation and practice of the invention.
B. The Constitution and the First Patent Acts in the United States
In the United States, a similar progression of events was
unfolding, albeit in microcosm.
States had been granting
exclusionary rights to inventors since before implementation of the
Constitution in 1789.63 Just as in England, protection originally
had been granted to the first to import new technology, eventually
shifting to “patents of invention.”64 Also as in England, the quid
pro quo of such protection often included a requirement to fully
describe and practice the invention.65

61

Id. at 1291–92.
Id. at 1290–91.
63
See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law:
Antecedents (5, Part II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665, 668 & n.120 (1996).
64
See id. at 668.
65
Id. at 670. Walterscheid quotes a patent granted by New York in 1780 to Henry
Guest:
Provided nevertheless that the grant hereby made shall not take effect
until the said Henry Guest shall have filed in the secretary’s office in
62
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known as “the intellectual
property clause,” of the United States Constitution, authorizes
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”66 The clause
generally is understood to include two broad component parts. As
articulated by the Judiciary Committee reports of the House of
Representatives and the Senate prepared during enactment of the
Patent Act of 1952, a “first provision is to promote the progress of
science by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive right
to their writings, the word ‘science’ in this connection having the
meaning of knowledge in general.”67 A second provision “is that
Congress has the power to promote the progress of useful arts by
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their
discoveries.”68 There has been much confusion and debate over
the years about construction of the intellectual property clause,
both as to whether “Progress of Science and useful Arts” are
jointly objects for securing exclusive rights to both authors and
inventors, and with respect to the meaning of the term “science.”69
Walterscheid states that “[t]he fact that scientific discoveries
frequently are patentable only adds to the confusion. Indeed, it
may be for this reason that some commentators appear to view
these terms as interchangeable in their discussions of the patent
provision.”70 Walterscheid states that the term “science” generally
meant “knowledge” or “learning,”71 while the phrase “useful arts”
meant “basically helpful or valuable trades.”72
this State, a writing containing the names and description of the
materials aforesaid, and the method and process of making such
blubber and oyl, or a substitute of blubber and oyl; nor until the said
Henry Guest shall have a manufactory erected for the purpose, and
shall have made such blubber and oyl, of the materials aforesaid,
within this State.
Id.
66

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952).
68
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952).
69
See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 120–21 (2002).
70
Id. at 121.
71
See id. at 125.
72
See id. at 126.
67
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It would appear, however, that there is at least some overlap in
the meanings of the terms “science” and “useful arts” as those
terms were understood at the time the Constitution was drafted.
Mokyr, for example, points out that the concept of “usefulness”
that developed during eighteenth century Britain “involved both
practical uses (that is, technology) and a moral and intellectual
improvement of humanity so that people would be taught more
virtuous lives.”73 According to Mokyr, the notion of “‘useful arts,’
what we call today science and technology,”74 arose in conjunction
with recognition of mutual reinforcement of useful knowledge and
economic performance,75 wherein under an “Enlightenment
view . . . it was the role of the state to enhance prosperity and
growth and to encourage the formation and dissemination of useful
knowledge.”76 Advancement of the “useful arts,” in effect,
embodied the ideas of Francis Bacon, as stated by Mokyr, “to
attain material progress through technological progress [by]
application of inductive and experimental method to investigate
nature, the creation of a universal natural history, and
reorganization of science as a human activity.”77 The three
components of this “Baconian program” were “research into
natural phenomenon,” a research agenda “directed to areas where
there was a high chance of solving practical problems—in
medicine, manufacturing, navigation, and so on,” and
minimization of “access costs to this knowledge . . . not only by
dissemination but also by organizing and classifying what was
known.”78 The distinction, therefore, between “science” and
“useful arts” as those terms were employed in the Constitution,
appears to be a distinction between knowledge—that is, knowledge
based on natural phenomena—and its application. In other words,
and as again expressed by Mokyr, it was the Enlightenment “idea
of useful knowledge which gave people power over nature and not

73

JOEL MOKYR, THE ENLIGHTENED ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY
1700–1850, 35 (2009).
74
Id. at 40.
75
Id. at 35.
76
Id. at 26.
77
Id. at 41.
78
Id. at 40.
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(just) over other people. It is this kind of power that . . . is at the
very core of what increasingly mattered in this period.”79
As we have seen, during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries new application of principle became a basis for
patentable distinction as a substitute for bare novelty.80 Further,
just as protection under section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies was
limited to manufactures, and later to methods associated with
manufactures, the type of principle—the new application of which
would qualify for patent protection under the constitutional
category of “useful arts”—generally was limited to that of a
naturally-occurring power over nature, as opposed to knowledge
which gave people power “(just) over other people.” The phrase
“useful arts,” or “useful knowledge,” nevertheless, is very broad.
Mokyr, for example, specifically applies the phrase “useful
knowledge,” as that concept was understood, to applications of
formal mathematics and demographic statistics to develop actuarial
techniques supporting advancements in the insurance industry in
the eighteenth century.81
Moreover, if, as Walterscheid argues, the term “science,” as
that term was employed at the time the Constitution was drafted, is
to be interpreted broadly as “knowledge,” and if the phrases
“useful arts” and “useful knowledge” were considered equivalent
during the same period, as referenced by Mokyr, then “knowledge”
and “useful knowledge” appear to properly belong within the same
clause, which not only includes securing to authors an exclusive
right to their writings and to inventors an exclusive right to their
discoveries, but also incorporates James Madison’s proposal, “to
encourage by proper premiums and provisions the advancement of

79
80
81

Id.

Id. at 35.
See supra text accompanying notes 23–62.
See MOKYR, supra note 73, at 230.
The idea that useful knowledge of any kind should be brought to bear
on the production of goods and services and that it should therefore
be applied to the insurance industry is typical of the age of
Enlightenment. Formal mathematics and demographics statistics
were important components of the epistemic base that supported the
correct actuarial techniques in this industry.
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useful knowledge and discoveries.”82 In other words, the clause is
open-ended, not only in the types of exclusive rights that can be
granted by Congress, but also in the types of knowledge beyond
“writings,” and the types of useful knowledge beyond
“discoveries,” that can be rewarded. Under this view, the types of
“useful knowledge” and “discoveries” potentially subject to
exclusionary rights, therefore, is broad, excluding, as discussed
above, only purely human interactions that only leverage power
over others.83
Madison referred to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known
as “the intellectual property” clause, in the Federalist papers:
The utility of this power will scarcely be
questioned. The copyright of authors has been
82

WALTERSCHEID, supra note 69, at 116–17.
What is common to the balanced composition of the clause are the
terms “promote,” “progress,” “securing,” and “limited times.” The
usual interpretation is that Congress is given two separate powers
involving the common use of these terms. In this view, it is given
power (1) “to promote the progress of science . . . by securing for
limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . writings,”
and (2) “to promote the progress of . . . useful arts by securing for
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their . . .
discoveries.”
. . . A careful comparison of the actual language of the clause
with the proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney suggests that
the conventional wisdom is wrong, and that the clause is actually a
consolidation and incorporation of three separate and distinct
proposals presented by these gentlemen. . . . What is not generally
recognized is that the clause incorporates a third proposal, namely,
that by Madison to encourage by proper premiums and provisions the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.

Id.
83

See supra text accompanying note 79. Interestingly, the Royal Society, which was
founded in 1660 on the principles espoused by Francis Bacon, had as its stated purpose:
“To improve the knowledge of natural things, and all useful Arts, Manufacturers,
Mechanik practices, Engines and Inventions by Experiments (not meddling with Divinity,
Metaphysics, Moralls, Politiks, Grammar, Rhetoric or Logick).” HENRY GEORGE LYONS,
THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 1660–1940: A HISTORY OF ITS ADMINISTRATION UNDER ITS
CHARTERS 41 (1944). “Grammar” and “Rhetoric” were the seventeenth century
equivalents of social science, which broadly embraces disciplines associated with society
and human behavior, including, for example, economics, information science,
management science, marketing and political economy. See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM
ADAMSON, PIONEERS OF MODERN EDUCATION 1600–1700, 65 (1921).
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solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
the common law. The right to useful inventions
seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
The public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals. The States cannot make
effectual provision for either of the cases, and most
of them have anticipated the decision on this point,
by laws passed at the instance of Congress.84
Although the intellectual property clause makes reference only
to “the exclusive right” to be secured by the authority of Congress,
Madison’s reference to “the public good” coinciding with the
claims of individuals can only be understood as the benefit to the
public by introduction of writings and useful inventions and
ultimate ownership by the public of them by their disclosure.
Grant of a limited period of exclusivity to promote generation and
introduction of knowledge and its application is consistent with
Mokyr’s view of the “Baconian program” in Great Britain:
The Baconian program was built on two
unshakeable axioms: that the expansion of useful
knowledge would solve social and economic
problems, and that the dissemination of existing
knowledge to more and more people would lead to
substantial efficiency gains. It was also understood
how this was to be brought about. On its own,
artisanal knowledge would be insufficient. Without
the work of natural philosophers, who would infuse
it with new knowledge and connect different
industries, an artisanal economy would eventually
revert to a technologically stationary state.85
Mokyr, instead of partitioning knowledge and its application,
as might be suggested by separately addressing advancement of
“knowledge” and “useful knowledge,” emphasizes their
“complementarity,” at least as they contributed to technological
progress in Britain during this period:

84
85

THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
MOKYR, supra note 73, at 61.
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Rather than posing the question of whether it was
theorists or practical people who brought about
technological progress, we need to see the
fundamental complementarity between them. It
was precisely their presence together and their
ability to interact and produce something larger that
has the power to explain Britain’s technological
successes.86
This does not mean that the framers of the United States
Constitution intended that a period of exclusivity was to be granted
to pure acquisition of knowledge; the clear language of the clause
references “Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”87 Here, the parallelism of
the clause is spelled out; authors are to be granted exclusive rights
for their writings, and inventors for their discoveries. However,
the “Progress of Science and useful Arts” arguably was to be
advanced by granting exclusive rights in both “Writings and
Discoveries.” With respect to inventors, then, the question
becomes who qualifies as an “inventor” and what is a “discovery.”
Shortly after the Constitution came into effect on March 4,
1789, a bill known as “H.R. 10” was introduced to “promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”88 The bill provided for
grant of letters patent to any person who has “invented or
discovered any [new] art, manufacture, engine, machine, invention
or device, or any improvement upon, or in some art, manufacture,
engine, machine, invention or device, not before known or used.”89
There was no geographical limit to the phrase “not before known
or used,” and Walterscheid states that, consistent with Liardet v.
Johnson,90 where publication and “prior working” consequently
became recognized as bars to patentability, “[t]he intent seems to

86

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
88
See e.g., EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787–1836, 87 (1998).
89
Id. at 92.
90
Liardet v. Johnson, (1788) 1 Web. P.C. 53 (K.B.); 1 Carp. 35.
87
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have been merely to have novelty treated the same in the United
States as it was in Great Britain.”91
This is not to say, however, that patents of importation were to
be excluded. To the contrary, the original section six of H.R. 41,
the bill that, with amendment, would become the Patent Act of
1790, specifically provided for such protection.92 However,
requirements to provide an enabling disclosure and to recognize
publication removed the conventional geographic barriers
associated with working the invention and prior knowledge.93
Further, written description—both of the invention and as prior
knowledge—inherently raised the question of the scope of
protection to be afforded by exclusive rights, in that
representations of the invention or the art could be much broader
than what was actually practiced. Inventors logically would be
interested in obtaining protection that was as broad as possible
despite the fact that, in general, all aspects of any invention could
separately be found in the prior art. Yet, protection could not be so
broad as to hurt trade, the prohibition against which had been the
central directive underlying grant of exclusive rights to promote
importation since the early sixteenth century.94
The word “principle,” in association with patentable subject
matter, came into common use in the United States very early.
Even prior to the Patent Act of 1790, a petition was filed by one
John Churchman on April 15, 1789 for an exclusive right to a
method for determining longitude.95 The House Committee
reported a petition stating that Churchman had “applied his
91

WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 94.
Section six, as originally drafted, would be replaced before passage of the bill, but
originally stated:
And it is hereby further enacted, that any person, who shall after the
passing of this act, first import into the United States from any
foreign country, any art, machine, engine, device or invention, or any
improvement thereon, not before used or known in said states, such
person, his executors, administrators and assigns, shall have the full
benefit of this act, as if he were the original inventor or improver
within said States.
H.R. 41, 1st Cong. (1790), quoted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 452.
93
See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
94
See supra text accompanying notes 23–25.
95
See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 82.
92
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principles to many instances in Cook’s voyages,” and that “he is
also engaged in constructing tables for determining the longitude at
sea upon magnetic principles.”96 The committee was “of opinion
that such efforts deserve encouragement, and that a law should
pass to secure to Mr. Churchman, for a term of years, the exclusive
pecuniary emolument to be derived from the publication of these
several inventions.”97
John Fitch also presented a petition for exclusive rights, on
May 13, 1789, in view of his being “the original discoverer of the
principle of applying the power of steam to the purposes of
navigation.”98 The scope of protection would be to “preclude
subsequent improves upon his principle from participating therein
until the expiration of the term of his exclusive grants.”99 Fitch
also distinguished between the “principle” of his invention and the
“modes” of its application: as pointed out by Walterscheid, Fitch
stated that his invention “consists in applying the force of Steam,
and not in which of these modes it is applied.”100
Similarly, James Rumsey commented in a letter to Jefferson on
June 6, 1789:
Such machines as are already in use (and their
principles not under any restrictions by patents)
then Every person Improving on Such machines
ought to have a grant for Such improvement and no
more, but Where the principle itself is new I humbly
Conceive that it ought to be Secured to the inventor
for a Limited time . . . .101
Walterscheid observes that “Rumsey agreed with Fitch that a
person who invents a new ‘principle’ should have a broad
dominant patent.”102

96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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H.R. 10 specified that, in the event of a contest between
inventors, a jury would determine priority of invention if “the
inventions or discoveries aforesaid, claimed by two or more
parties, shall appear to be substantially the same, both in principle
and execution.”103 Further, what is believed to be a typescript of
the bill, discovered in 1955, states at section 5 that a contest over
priority of invention shall be determined by justices who will
“adjudge” whether they are the same, “both in principle and
execution.”104
H.R. 10 ultimately was replaced by H.R. 41. However, another
bill, H.R. 44, modeled on H.R. 10105 and directed to an invention to
prevent counterfeiting, was considered separately by a committee
that recommended H.R. 44 become law, citing the Act of British
Parliament granting Bolton and Watt’s patent. The “Principle” of
the invention at issue in the bill was of central concern:
It was on this Ground that the British Parliament
passed an Act in 1786 securing to Bolton & Watt a
new Invention to condense Steam for working
Steam Engines, the Principle of which was to draw
the Steam out of the Cylinder by an exhausted
Receiver which could be done in so many different
Forms that had they taken a Patent for their Form,
others might be used not described in their
Specification and they would be robbed of the
Principle of their Invention, which was therefore
granted by a Special Act of Parliament.106
However, the Patent Act of 1790 as enacted did not refer to
application of principle as a test for patentability. Rather, the
“invented or discovered . . . useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine or device” need only be “sufficiently useful and
103

Id. at 89. The quoted language is by Fitch, who had apparently obtained a copy of
H.R. 10; no copy of H.R. 10 is now known to survive. Id. at 88.
104
Id. at 102.
105
See id. at 117.
106
Id. at 118–19. (emphasis added) (quoting PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS DURING THE
YEARS 1789 AND 1790, RELATING TO THE FIRST PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAWS, 22 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y, at 364–65 (1940). H.R. 44 was ultimately discarded in favor of H.R. 41,
which addressed patents generally. See id. at 120.
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important, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the
United States.”107
It became apparent shortly after enactment of the Patent Act of
1790 that the administrative burdens on the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War and the Attorney General, who made up the
patent board,108 were excessive. Jefferson, then Secretary of State,
drafted a patent bill primarily intended to “reduce the ministerial
requirements placed on the State Department and [Jefferson] in the
issuance of patents.”109 The most significant of the changes that
carried over into later proposed bills and, ultimately, the Patent Act
of 1793 was introduction of a registration system to replace that of
examination under the Patent Act of 1790.110
Interestingly, Jefferson’s draft provided a defense to patent
infringement where the invention “is so unimportant and obvious
that it ought not to be the basis of an exclusive right.”111 This
provision was not carried over into later proposals, and
obviousness did not become a component of statutory patent law in
the United States until the Patent Act of 1952.112 Jefferson’s draft
also broadened the scope of patent-eligible subject matter to
include any “composition of matter” and required a description of
“the manner of using or process of compounding the same” along
with “specimens of the ingredients, and of the composition of
matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment.”113
Jefferson’s draft bill, if it was introduced at all, was replaced by
H.R. 166.114 In what appears to be an ode to importation, H.R. 166
provided “[t]hat the monies to be paid, as directed by this act, into
the treasury, shall be appropriated to the expense of procuring and
importing useful arts or machines from foreign countries.”115 Like
Jefferson’s defense to patent infringement, this provision was not
107

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
See Patent Act of 1790 § 1.
109
WALTERSCHEID, supra, note 88, at 201.
110
See id.
111
Id. at 204.
112
See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006)).
113
See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 200.
114
See id. at 205.
115
Id. at 199.
108
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included in what ultimately became the Patent Act of 1793.
However, H.R. 166 further required that the inventor “fully explain
the principle and the several modes, in which he has contemplated
the application of that principle or character, by which it may be
distinguished from other inventions.”116 This language, along with
a proposal117 that the bill be amended to state that a “discovery”
shall not consist of “changing the form or the proportions of any
machine, or composition of matter, in any degree,” were adopted
in the final bill that became the Patent Act of 1793.118
Although the Patent Act of 1790 provided no more of a test for
patentability than that of being “sufficiently useful and important,”
the Patent Act of 1793 did provide for patent protection to “any
person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle
of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter.”119
The type of principle is not specified and, given the broad meaning
of both the terms “science” and “useful arts” of Article 1, Section
8, Clause 8, the type of principle could be equally broad.
However, as applied to patent protection, courts generally limited
the scope of patent-eligibility to application of naturally-occurring
principle. Other types of principles, such as those limited to power
only over other people—as in, for example, morality, religion, and
government—appear never to have been the subject of patent
protection, at least as adjudicated in the United States.
Further, as stated above, the parallelism of the intellectual
property clause provides Congress the authority to secure for
“limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries.”120 Broadly interpreting the terms “Science” and
“useful Arts,” and linking promotion of both the progress of
“Science” and “useful Arts” to securing for limited times to
inventors an exclusive right, does not imply an authority to grant
Congress the right to secure such protection to individuals the
exclusive right to discoveries that are mere observations. The two
116

Id. at 207.
See id. at 222 n.96 (noting that the proposal may have been made by either Joseph
Barnes or Thomas Jefferson).
118
See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836).
119
Id.
120
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
117
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terms, “inventors” and “discoveries,” were used in conjunction in
the clause and, at that time, “discoveries,” in the context of
inventorship implied some useful application of principle and its
public disclosure, as opposed to mere observation.
Utility and public possession of a discovery were, in fact, part
of the exchange for an exclusionary right, and these prerequisites
in the United States were consistent with British common law. For
example, as stated by Collier with respect to British common law:
A patent is an agreement between the King and the
Subject, that if the latter will put the public in
possession of a useful secret, he shall have the
exclusive benefit of that secret for the first fourteen
years. It is obvious, that if the public be already in
possession of the discovery, the patentee can make
no such return or compensation for the patent he
obtains.121
Therefore, even without the restraint of construction of the
intellectual property clause under the Constitution, consistency
with the British model of patentability strongly implies that the
grant of an exclusionary right based on a “secret” observation by
an inventor was linked to subsequent public disclosure of that
observation and its use by the inventor.
Godson went further and equated the word “inventor” with a
“discoverer, or he who first finds out a thing, of which a limited
monopoly may lawfully be granted.”122 He specifically stated that
the application of a principle in the absence of its discovery was
insufficient to make a patentee an “inventor.”123 Godson also
linked determination of “a true and first inventor” under the Statute
of Monopolies to public disclosure, stating that publication by
another would defeat entitlement to patent protection as a matter of

121
JOHN DYER COLLIER, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 99
(London, A. Wilson, 2d ed. 1803).
122
RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
AND OF COPYRIGHT 26–27 (London, William Benning & Co. 1851).
123
Id. at 29 (“If the principle of the invention be taken from a scientific work the
patentee is not an inventor.”).
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policy “to insure an early production of the efforts of genius.”124
Conversely, discovery of “objects of patents . . . new in England”
must also be published in order for an individual to assume the
“character of an inventor,” regardless of whether the invention was
imported:
Upon the whole, then, the character of an inventor
may be obtained by a person in three ways, by
bringing with him and publishing to his countrymen
the productions of the genius of foreigners; by
publishing what others as well as himself may have
found out at home; or by publishing what he alone
has discovered.125
Therefore, at least in Great Britain, “discovery” was associated
with application of a newly discovered principle and patent
protection was contingent upon publication.126 So, consistent with
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution, which, as
argued by Walterscheid, does not preclude protection for imports,
“discovery,” in the context of inventorship in Great Britain, from
which patent protection in the United States was derived, implied
application of a newly discovered principle, and patent protection
was granted both to encourage advancement of such new
application, as well as to disseminate knowledge through its
publication.
C. Application of the Patent Act of 1793
The interlocking nature of “inventorship,” “discovery” and
“advancement of science and the useful arts” appears to have been
carried over from England into U.S. jurisprudence. Justice Story,
in his note, “On the Patent Laws,”127 which appeared as an
appendix to Justice Marshall’s opinion in Evans v. Eaton,128

124

Id. at 30 (“If two persons severally discover the same thing, the one who obtains a
patent for it, before the other has made it public, will be adjudged to be ‘the true and first
inventor’. . . . This rule is necessary to insure an early production of the efforts of
genius.”).
125
Id. at 32.
126
See id.
127
Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 app. at 13–29 (1818).
128
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
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quoted extensively the English Boulton129 and Hornblower130cases,
stating that they “contain more learning on the subject of patents
than can be found in any other adjudications.”131 As discussed
above, in Hornblower, the Justices ultimately agreed that, in
essence, although a patent may not be obtained for “mere
principles,” methods of application of those principles may qualify
as “manufactures” under section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies if
the patentee “specifies the particular parts requisite to produce the
effect intended, and states the manner how they are to be
applied.”132
In the United States, the question of how broadly the statutory
categories under the Patent Act of 1793133 could be applied was
not seriously tested; most cases instead focused on new application
of principle as a threshold of patentable distinction over prior art or
as a test of infringement. For example, Chief Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion in Evans v. Eaton, the first Supreme Court
case to test patentable distinction.134 The patent at issue was
directed to a flour mill known as a “hopper-boy.”135 Oliver Evans,
the owner of the patent, claimed as his invention “the application
of those principles . . . during the process of the manufacture . . . to
the improvement of the process of manufacturing flour.136
Elsewhere in the schedule, Evans strictly claimed the “peculiar
properties or principles” possessed by his invention, namely “the
spreading turning and gathering the meal at one operation, and the
rising and lowering of its arms by its motion, to accommodate
itself to any quantity of meal it has to operate on.”137

129

Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 463.
Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.); 8 T.R. 95.
131
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) app. at 18.
132
101 Eng. Rep. at 1290.
133
See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836) (listing as
categories “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter”).
134
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 454.
135
Id. at 455.
136
Id. at 463 n.b.
137
Id. at 468 n.b.
130
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Justice Marshall reversed and annulled the lower court’s
judgment for the defendant.138 Like the reasoning by the King’s
Bench in Hornblower, the Court considered the “application of . . .
principles” to be what Evans claimed as his “invention or
improvement in the art.”139 In return for the exclusionary rights
Evans was to receive,140 Marshall stated that Evans would have to
enable others to understand the improvements he made.141
Therefore, despite language to the effect that Evans was claiming
“principles,” Justice Marshall construed the claim by Evans to
extend only to the “application of these principles,” and only
insofar as they represented “improvements.”142
In 1822, the Supreme Court again considered Evans’ patent.143
This time, Justice Story, writing for the Court, invalidated the
patent despite the fact that its specification sufficiently described
the improved hopper-boy, as well as its manner of construction.144
According to Story, Evans’ claim to the “peculiar properties or
principles which this machine possesses,”145 without “any other
qualification . . . is just such a claim as would be made by the
plaintiff, if the whole machine was substantially in its structure and
combination new.”146 According to Story, without distinguishing
the improvement from what was known, Evans claimed more
protection than the Patent Act permitted.147 As stated by Story:
From this enumeration of the provisions of the act,
it is clear that the party cannot entitle himself to a
patent for more than his own invention; and if his
patent includes things before known, or before in
use, as his invention, he is not entitled to recover,
138

See id. at 519.
Id. at 515.
140
Id. at 517.
141
Id. at 518 (“[I]t will be incumbent on him to show the extent of his improvement, so
that a person understanding the subject may comprehend distinctly in what it consists.”).
142
Id.
143
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
144
Id. at 428.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 429. The Patent Act, as paraphrased by Story, “authorizes a patent to the
inventor, for his invention or improvement in any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter not known or used before the application.” Id.
139
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for his patent is broader than his invention. If,
therefore, the patent be for the whole of a machine,
the party can maintain a title to it only by
establishing that it is substantially new in its
structure and mode of operation.148
Story expanded on Marshall’s requirement that the patentee
“show the extent of his improvement, so that a person
understanding the subject may comprehend distinctly in what it
consists,”149 stating that the specification has two objects.150 The
first object had an enabling function, to make known the manner of
construction “so as to enable artisans to make and use it, and thus
to give the public the full benefit of the discovery after the
expiration of the patent.”151 The other object had a notice function,
“to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own
invention, so as to ascertain if he claim anything that is in common
use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice or injury
from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise
innocently suppose not to be patented.”152
Since Evans’
specification did not “describe what his own improvement is, and
to limit his patent to such improvement,”153 it was “defective for
not specifying that improvement,” according to Story.154
Therefore, whereas Marshall upheld the patent as a new
application of principle contingent upon enabling others with its
knowledge,155 Story invalidated the patent for having claimed,
“without any other qualification,”156 the “peculiar properties or
principles which this machine possesses,”157 thereby necessarily

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 430.
Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 518 (1818).
Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 433.
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
Id.
See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 518 (1818).
Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 428.
Id.
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extending the exclusive right beyond his improvement to the
“whole machine” so improved.158
Carry-over from England continued in Pennock v. Dialogue,159
where Justice Story drew from the English case Wood v. Zimmer160
to state that use of the word “invention” in the “context” of Wood
meant “not the abstract discovery, but the thing invented; not the
new secret principle, but the manufacture resulting from it.”161
The “context” referred to by Story was a quotation from Lord
Chief Justice Gibbs, who said, “[t]o entitle a man to a patent, the
invention must be new to the world. The public sale of that which
is afterwards made the subject of the patent, though sold by the
inventor only, makes the patent void.”162 Story also reiterated that
the “main object” of the Patent Act of 1793 “was ‘to promote the
progress of science and useful arts’”; and this could be done best,
by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and
vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible; having a
due regard to the rights of the inventor.”163 A “reasonable reward
to inventors” of an exclusive right to “stimulate the efforts of

158

See id. (“From this manner of stating his invention, without any other qualification,
it is apparent that it is just such a claim as would be made use of by the plaintiff, if the
whole machine was substantially in its structure and combinations new.”).
159
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
160
Wood v. Zimmer, (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 161; 1 Holt. N.P. 58.
161
Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 20.
162
Id. (quoting Wood, 171 Eng. Rep. at 162.). As discussed above, English common
law under the Statute of Monopolies provided for exclusive rights for “the sole working
or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm.” 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, §
5. The Patent Act of 1793 provided no such geographical limitation. However, at least
within the relevant territorial confines, Justice Story drew a parallel in Pennock between
the sixth section of the Statute of Monopolies and the Patent Act of 1793 with respect to
interpretation of the term “invention” and in the policy of barring patent protection
subsequent to public use by the inventor. Story stated that “the words of our statute are
not identical with those of the Statute of James, but it can scarcely admit of doubt, that
they must have been within the contemplation of those by whom it was framed, as well as
the construction which had been put upon them by Lord Coke.” Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
at 20–21. Coke, in turn, in his commentary upon the sixth section of the Statute of
Monopolies, stated that “if any other did use it at the making of the letters patent, or grant
of the privilege, it is declared and enacted to be void by this act.” Id. at 20. According to
Story, Coke’s “use here referred to has always been understood to be a public use, and
not a private or surreptitious use in fraud of the inventor.” Id.
163
Pennock, 27 U.S. (2. Pet.) at 19.
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genius” was considered to be of secondary importance in Story’s
view.164
In Whitney v. Emmett,165 Justice Baldwin, while riding circuit,
upheld a patent166 directed to a method for manufacturing glass
knobs.167 Like Justice Story, Justice Baldwin held that a new
invention cannot consist of the “discovery of some new principle,
theory, elementary truth, or an improvement upon it, abstracted
from its application.”168 Rather, the invention lies in the
application of that discovery or principle.169 Further, Justice
Baldwin extended the scope of the patentable subject matter to a
“method of doing a thing,” and, as did the King’s Bench in
Hornblower, effectively equated methods with the means by which
they are practiced.170
Justice Story also equated method and means. In Ames v.
Howard,171 Justice Story upheld the construction of a claim
directed to a cylinder “for the purpose of making paper.”172
According to Story, “[i]t requires no commentary to establish, that
the application of an old thing to a new use, without any other
invention, is not a patentable contrivance,”173 but that a patentee
may claim “the construction and use of the peculiar cylinder above
described, and the several parts thereof in combination for the
purpose aforesaid,”174 that is, for the purpose of making paper. As
did Justice Baldwin in Whitney, therefore, Story linked the

164

See id.
Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585).
166
See id. at 1083.
167
See id. at 1079.
168
Id. at 1078.
169
Id. (“[W[hen such discovery is applied to any practical purpose, in the new
construction, operation or effects of machinery or composition of matter, producing a
new substance, or an old one in a new way . . . . [I]t is a ‘discovery,’ ‘invention’ or
‘improvement’ within the acts of congress.”).
170
Id. (“[A] patent for a mode or method detached from all physical application, would
not refer to an engine or machine, but when referred to the mode of operation, so as to
produce the effect, would be considered as for an engine or a machine.”).
171
Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 326).
172
See id. at 757.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 756.
165
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patentability of the method with that of the machinery by which
the method is conducted.
D. Continuity Under the Patent Act of 1836
Even under a new patent act, U.S. courts continued to find that
new application of a principle was a benchmark for qualification as
statutory subject matter. In 1836, a new patent act was enacted in
the United States;175 among other things, it reinstituted substantive
examination of patent applications and eliminated the language in
the Patent Act of 1793, stating “that simply changing the form or
proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any
degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.”176 Nevertheless, new
application of principle as a threshold for patent eligibility
continued. For example, in Blanchard v. Sprague,177 Justice Story
upheld the subject patent because there was “described, not a mere
function, but a machine of a particular structure, whose modes of
operation are pointed out, to accomplish a particular purpose,
function, or end.”178 The fact that the specification linked the
invention’s function to a “particular machine” justified a
determination that the machine complied with the “liberal
construction”179 to which patents, in Story’s view, were clearly
entitled.180 Therefore, Justice Story, just as he had done in Ames,
linked patentability of practice with the patentability of a particular
machine as an expression of application of a principle.
Justice Story continued to demand particularity from patentees.
In Stone v. Sprague,181 Justice Story held that a “patentee limits his
invention to the specific machinery and mode . . . set forth, and

175

Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (amended 1870, repealed 1952).
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836).
177
Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518).
178
Id. at 650.
179
See id. (“Patents, then, are clearly entitled to a liberal construction, since they are not
granted as restrictions upon the rights of the community, but are granted ‘to promote
science and useful arts.’”).
180
Id. (“[I]t is a particular machine, constituted in the way pointed out, for the
accomplishment of a particular end or object. The patent is for a machine, and not for a
principle or function detached from machinery.”).
181
Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161 (C.C.D.R.I.1840) (No. 13,487).
176
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specifically described in the specification.”182 To do otherwise
would be “an attempt to maintain a patent for an abstract principle,
or for all possible and probable modes whatsoever . . . although
they may be invented by others, and substantially differ from the
mode described by the plaintiff in the specification.”183
Similarly, in Wyeth v. Stone,184 Justice Story again
distinguished between attempts to patent a principle and its
application. Story held, as “utterly unmaintainable in point of
law,”185 a claim “to cut ice of a uniform size, by means of an
apparatus or by any other power than human.”186 According to
Story, such a claim was “broader than the actual invention of the
patentee,” and therefore constituted a “claim for an art or principle
in the abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery, by
which ice is to be cut.”187 “Upon the principles of the common
law,” such a claim was “utterly void, and the patent is a nullity.”188
Story further stated that, nevertheless, several embodiments of an
invention could be embraced within the scope of a single patent on
the basis that they shared a common application of principle.189
In Howe v. Abbott,190 Justice Story again appeared to link new
application of principle to patentable invention. Here, he found
that the application of an old process to the manufacture of
something new is not patentable.191 To be entitled to a patent,
there “must be some new process, or some new machinery used, to
produce the result.”192 Likewise, according to Story, “[h]e, who
produces an old result by a new mode or process, is entitled to a
patent for that mode or process. But he cannot have a patent for a
result merely, without using some new mode or process to produce
182

Id.
Id. at 162.
184
Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107).
185
Id. at 727.
186
See id.
187
See id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 729. (“[H]e might lawfully unite in one patent all the modes, in which he
contemplated the application of his invention, and all the different sorts of machinery, or
modifications of machinery, by which or to which it might be applied . . . .”).
190
Howe v. Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 656 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766).
191
Id. at 658.
192
Id.
183
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it.”193 Story thereby squarely placed methods within the scope of
statutory subject matter and, interestingly, divorced the
patentability of methods from a need to link them to novelty of
machinery employed to conduct the method or to obtain the result
produced.
Howe can be better understood when viewed in comparison
with Bean v. Smallwood,194 in which Story stated that “the thing
itself which is to be patented must be new and not the mere
application of it to a new purpose or object.”195 Taken together,
Howe and Bean can only be reconciled by understanding that
although both a machine and a method of its operation or use may
be an embodiment of principle, the principle need not be the same.
Further, considering Story’s dicta in Wyeth—asserting that several
modes sharing a common principle can be embraced within a
single patent—both an apparatus and method of its use, if they
indeed share a common application of principle, should be
considered a single invention. This conclusion is consistent with
Judge Lawrence’s opinion in Hornblower, whereby Watt’s
application of principle as a method could be construed to be a
manufacture within the meaning of the Statute of James.196
In 1853, Justice McLean for the Supreme Court in LeRoy v.
Tatham197 distinguished between “principle” in the abstract and its
application under patent law:
The word principle is used by elementary writers on
patent subjects, and sometimes in adjudications of
courts, with such a want of precision in its
application, as to mislead. It is admitted, that a
principle is not patentable. A principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can
claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can
an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one
193

Id.
Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,173).
195
Id. at 1143.
196
See Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.) 1291–92; 8 T.R.
105–07; supra note 61and accompanying text.
197
LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853).
194
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be discovered in addition to those already
known. . . .
In all such cases, the processes used to extract,
modify, and concentrate natural agencies,
constitute the invention. The elements of the power
exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but
in applying them to useful objects.198
The language employed by Justice McLean implies that the
types of principle—i.e., the type of “fundamental truth,” “original
cause” or “motive”—are “natural agencies” that are discovered.
Although not discussed by McLean, his characterization of
agencies as “natural” can only mean that the patentability of their
application stands in contrast to application of agencies that are not
natural. Principles that are a product of mankind—such as
government, religious tenets, morality, etiquette and custom—
would not qualify, and it appears that courts generally relied on
that assumption. Justice McLean, for example, drew from
Househill Company v. Nielson,199 which stated that a “patent will
be good though the subject of the patent consists of the discovery
of a great, general, and most comprehensible principle in science
or law of nature, if that principle is by the specification applied to
any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result
and benefit not previously attained.”200 Justice McLean appeared
also to echo Justice Story’s prohibition in Howe against obtaining a
“patent for a result merely,”201 by stating that “[a] patent is not
good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would
prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any
means whatsoever.”202
In O’Reilly v. Morse,203 the Supreme Court upheld seven of
eight claims of Samuel F. B. Morse’s patent directed to his
telegraph and its use, but denied granting Morse exclusivity to a

198

Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added).
Househill Company v. Nielson, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 616; 1 Web. P.C. 673.
200
LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added) (quoting Househill, 1 Web. P.C. at 683).
201
Howe v. Abbot, 12 F. Cas. 656, 658 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766); see also
supra text accompanying notes 171–74.
202
LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175.
203
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
199
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principle apart from its embodiment.204 The eighth claim expressly
stated that Morse’s invention was not limited to any “specific
machinery, or parts of machinery, described in the foregoing
specifications and claims.”205 Instead, Morse was to be bound only
by the “essence of my invention,” which was stated to be “the use
of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing
intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a
new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first
inventor or discoverer.”206 Justice Taney, for the Court, stated that
the terms of the claim were clear: “It is impossible to
misunderstand the extent of this claim. He claims the exclusive
right to every improvement where the motive power is the electric
or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”207
The Court’s denial of the eight claim’s validity appears to have
been based on policy grounds, in that the patentee “shuts the door
against inventions of other persons, [while] the patentee would be
able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties and
powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring to
light.”208 Therefore, the Court held that “the claim is too broad,
and not warranted by law.”209 The Court distinguished Morse’s
eighth claim from Neilson v. Harford.210 There, the Court of
Exchequer upheld a patent claim directed to a method for
“throwing hot air into [a] furnace, instead of cold, and thereby

204
205
206

See id. at 113.
Id. at 112.
See id. Morse’s eighth claim was as follows:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of
machinery, described in the foregoing specification and claims; the
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the
electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however
developed for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or
signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.

Id.
207
208
209
210

Id.
See id. at 113.
Id.
Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rpt. 1266 (Exch. Div.); 8 M. & W. 806.
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increasing the intensity of the heat”211 and to the efficiency of
“fires, forges, and furnaces, where a blowing apparatus is
required.”212 Despite the fact that Neilson claimed no particular
mode of constructing the receptacle213 to embody “the principle
that hot air will promote the ignition of fuel better than cold,”214
the court upheld Neilson’s patent because he “had invented a
mechanical mode of applying [the principle] to furnaces; and that
his invention consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, between
the blower and the furnace, and by this means heating the air after
it left the blower, and before it was thrown into the fire.”215
Morse, on the other hand, claimed the exclusive use of
communication at a distance by “electric or galvanic current,”
regardless of the means.216 This, in contrast to Neilson, went too
far and represented to the Court an attempt to claim exclusive use
of a principle disembodied from its application.217 Public
disclosure was also a factor underlying the policy denying
protection to exclusive use of principle apart from any limitation
211

O’Reilly at 115 (citing Nielson, 151 Eng. Rpt. at 1266).
Id. at 114 (citing Nielson, 151 Eng. Rpt. at 1266).
213
Id. at 115. As stated by the Court in O’Reilly with reference to Neilson:
We see nothing in this opinion differing in any degree from the
familiar principles of law applicable to patent cases. Neilson claimed
no particular mode of constructing the receptacle, or of heating it. He
pointed out the manner in which it might be done, but admitted that it
might also be done in a variety of ways; and at a higher or lower
temperature; and that all of them would produce the effect in a
greater or less degree, provided the air was heated by passing through
a heated receptacle. And hence it seems that the court at first
doubted, whether it was a patent for any thing more than the
discovery that hot air would promote the ignition of fuel better than
cold.
Id. at 115–16.
214
Id. at 116.
215
See id. As stated by the court:
But after much consideration, it was finally decided that this principle
must be regarded as well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a
mechanical mode of applying it to furnaces; and that his invention
consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, between the blower and
the furnace, and by this means heating the air after it left the blower,
and before it was thrown into the fire.
Id.
216
See id. at 112.
217
See id. at 116.
212
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on its embodiment.218 The Court, therefore, refused Morse’s
claimed “exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has
not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent.”219
The Supreme Court in Burr v. Duryee220 again limited
protection and held that the reissue of a valid patent to broaden
claims to cover all modes by which the object of the invention is to
be achieved would constitute “an attempt to convert an improved
machine into an abstraction, a principle or mode of operation, or a
still more vague and indefinite entity often resorted to in argument,
an ‘idea.’”221 Similarly, notice appeared to be the basis for the
Court’s holding:
The great question of the case is, whether the
Boyden machine infringes the patent originally
granted to Wells for his invention; and if not,
whether his assignees, by the use or abuse of the
right to surrender and reissue their patent, can so
expand it as to cover by ex post facto operation, all
subsequent inventions.222
In sum, consistent with development of case law prior to the
Patent Act of 1836, new application of principle or, more
specifically, new physical application of naturally-occurring
principle, continued to be the touchstone of statutory subject
matter, despite removal of language explicitly barring patent
protection where the invention represented “simply changing the
form or proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in
any degree.”223

218

Id. at 113 (“And if he can secure the exclusive use by his present patent, he may
vary it with a new discovery and development of science, and need place no description
of the new manner, process, or machinery, upon the records of the patent office. And
when the patent expires, the public must apply to him to learn what it is.”).
219
Id. at 113.
220
Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531 (1864).
221
Id. at 577.
222
Id. at 566.
223
See supra text accompanying notes 175–76.
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II. THE FALL OF THE APPLICATION OF NATURALLY-OCCURRING
PRINCIPLE AS A THRESHOLD FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A. Challenges Prior to the Patent Act of 1952
Until the mid 1860s, the classification of subject matter within
the statutory categories of the patent acts was not generally a point
of controversy. Most inventions were directed to machines and
methods of their use. Further, courts in the United States typically
found that machines and methods of their use were equivalent
when both embraced a common application of principle and, when
they constituted different inventions, the courts required each to be
a manifestation of some new application of principle.
Eventually, however, and inevitably, the variety of subject
matter for which applicants sought protection would begin to test
the limits of the statutory categories available for exclusionary
protection. In 1876, for example, the Supreme Court decided
Cochrane v. Deener,224 which would later figure prominently in
qualification of statutory subject matter.225 In Cochrane, the Court
held that a method for purifying the millings of flour practiced by
the defendants infringed the plaintiff’s patent because the only
differences were, albeit improvements, “a mere matter of form” of
the equipment employed to perform the method, despite the
existence of a later patent of a third party from which the
defendants had a license, covering machines that conduct their
process.226 The Court stated that claimed processes can be
practiced by different “instrumentalities” and still be patentable:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of
the particular form of the instrumentalities used,
cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing. If new and
useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of

224
225
226

Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972).
Id. at 786–87.
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machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is
an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to
perform the process may or may not be new or
patentable; whilst the process itself may be
altogether new, and produce an entirely new result.
The process requires that certain things should be
done with certain substances, and in certain order;
but the tools to be used in doing this may be of
secondary consequence.227
Note that the Court did not say that in order to qualify as a
statutory process the claimed subject matter must employ a
machine or transform material, but rather said only that machines
and processes that did transform materials qualified as an “art,”
and that the bases for patentability of a method and the apparatus
for conducting that method can be distinct.
In Baker v. Selden,228 the Supreme Court distinguished
between protections afforded by copyright and by patent. The
Court found that the copyright in a book describing a method of
bookkeeping—and including forms and blanks illustrating the
system and showing how it is to be used and carried out in
practice—did not protect the author against another’s use of the
system or the forms employed to illustrate the system. The Court
stated:
The description of the art in a book, though entitled
to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an
exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the
one is explanation; the object of the other is use.
The former may be secured by copyright. The latter
can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by
letters-patent.229

227
228
229

Id. at 787–88.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
Id. at 105.
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The Court, however, did not opine upon whether the subject
matter from the book was patentable,230 nor did it decide whether
the forms themselves were patentable subject matter.231
In Munson v. City of New York,232 the Court addressed the
patentability of a system of book-keeping.233 The Court found that
“there was no patentable novelty in plaintiff’s scheme,”234 and,
therefore, it could not “be held to involve any invention.”235 The
Court made a point of not expressing any opinion as to whether the
subject matter of the patent could be “considered as an ‘art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ within the
meaning of the patent laws.”236 Rather, acting on the presumption
that it did, it avoided the issue by invalidating the patent for lack of
novelty over the prior art.237
A few years later, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York, in United States Credit System v. American Credit
Indemnity,238 relied on Baker to hold that forms employed in an
insurance practice were not “new to persons skilled in that art, and
could not amount to any patentable invention or discovery.”239
The court also contrasted Munson, which “was for a contrivance to
preserve paid coupons and bonds, and might be patentable as a
machine or manufacture,”240 with the patent at issue, which was
“for a method of transacting common business.”241 Without
further explanation, the court held that the method “does not seem
to be patentable as an art.”242

230

Id. at 104. (“Whether the art might or might not have been patented, is a question
which is not before us. It was not patented, and is open free to the use of the public.”).
231
Id. (“And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must
necessarily be used as incident to it.”).
232
Munson v. City of New York, 124 U.S. 601 (1888).
233
Id. at 604.
234
Id.. at 604–05.
235
Id. at 605.
236
Id. at 604.
237
Id. at 604–05.
238
53 F. 818 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
239
Id. at 818–19.
240
Id. at 819.
241
Id.
242
Id.
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Novelty was also implicated in other tests of statutory subject
matter. For example, a process of preserving fruit by exposure to
borax (sodium borate) was held to be unpatentable by the Supreme
Court of the United States in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Brogdex Co.243 In deciding, the Court drew on a definition of
“manufacture” as “the production of articles for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by
machinery,” and “anything made for use from raw or prepared
materials.”244 The Court disputed the lower court’s conclusion that
the “product is a combination of the natural fruit and a boric
compound . . . to render the fruit resistant to decay . . . and is thus
an article of manufacture,”245 because there was “no change in the
name, appearance or general character of the fruit. It remains a
fresh orange fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore,”
thereby disqualifying the claimed subject matter from qualification
as a “manufacture” under the statute.246
In a case which later would be described as the origin of the
“mental steps” doctrine,247 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker,248 decided that “an
improvement in the method of counterbalancing engine main
shafts”249 was an attempt to monopolize a “formula for
determining dynamic forces, and this although those forces were
fully recognized and considered by engineers in published textbooks long before the appellee applied for his patent.”250 This
decision by the court closely paralleled earlier decisions that
rationalized denial of patentability on the basis of lack of novelty
where there was a previous understanding of the principle or its
general application.

243

American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 12.
247
In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (describing Don Lee, Inc. v.
Walker as the “genesis” of the mental step concept).
248
Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932).
249
Id. at 58.
250
Id. at 62.
244
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The Supreme Court weighed in with respect to the scope and
validity of claims directed to application of an empirical formula in
MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America.251 As
stated by the Court, if such a claim is to be considered valid, it
would only be by limiting the claim to “structure conforming to the
teachings” of the subject matter of the patent:
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be. . . . We
assume, without deciding the point, that this
advance was invention even though it was achieved
by the logical application of a known scientific law
to a familiar type of antenna. But it is apparent that
if this assumption is correct the invention was a
narrow one . . . and is to be strictly construed with
regard both to prior art and to alleged infringing
devices.252
Again, qualification as statutory subject matter was linked to
the novelty of claims that were viewed to embody physical
application of scientific principle. Patent eligibility hung on
evidence that the application of principle was novel, and not a
preemption of the principle altogether.
The Supreme Court continued to emphasize the importance of
novelty in the statutory subject matter context. In Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,253 the Court held unpatentable, claims
directed to combinations of strains of root nodule bacteria that did
not mutually inhibit each other’s ability to fix nitrogen from air in
specific leguminous plants, such as clover, alfalfa and soy beans.254
The claims were not limited to any particular combination of
nitrogen-fixing bacterial strains, but rather claimed any
combination of strains that were “unaffected by each other in
respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for

251
252
253
254

306 U.S. 86 (1939).
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
See id. at 132.
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which they are specific.”255 Applying such combinations, farmers
could avoid having to purchase strains of bacteria that were
specific to crops they intended to plant. It had previously been
thought that any combination of such inoculants would be
mutually inhibiting.256
The Court held that, because the use of the bacterial strains in
combination did not “improve in any way their natural
functioning,” they “serve the ends of nature originally provided
and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”257
Therefore, although the inventor, Bond, “made a new and different
composition of non-inhibitive strains which contributed utility and
economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial
inoculants . . . we think that that aggregation of species fell short
of invention within the meaning of patent statutes.”258 In other
words, despite the fact that Bond’s “aggregation of select strains
of the several species into one product is an application of that
newly-discovered natural principle [of lack of inhibition],” and
despite the fact that “it may have been the product of skill,” the
Court found that “it certainly was not the product of invention.”259
By disqualifying the claimed subject matter for lack of
“invention,” the Court appears, again, to be basing a holding
regarding statutory subject matter on novelty. Specifically, the
Court held that Bond’s claim to any combination of non-inhibiting

255

Id. at 128 n.1.
Id. at 130 (“Hence it had been assumed that the different species were mutually
inhibitive. Bond discovered that there are strains of each species of root-nodule bacteria
which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other.”).
257
Id. at 131.
258
Id. at 130–31 (emphasis added).
259
Id. at 131–32 (emphasis added). The Court relied on Cuno Eng’g Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941), to state that “a product must be more than
new and useful to be patented; it must satisfy the requirements of invention or
discovery.” Funk Bros., 33 U.S. at 131. The Court in Cuno, significantly, held that a
“new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not
merely the skill of the calling.” Cuno, 314 U.S. at 91. This language in Cuno was
severely criticized in later cases and, ultimately, qualified by the Supreme Court in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (1965), as being merely “rhetorical
embellishment of language going back to 1833.”
256
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mixed inoculants was “no more than the discovery of some of the
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.”260
B. Erecting the Crystal Palace of Patent Eligibility Tests
1. “Mental Steps,” “Technological Arts” and “Machine-orTransformation” Tests
a) Mental Steps
The Patent Act of 1952261 substituted the word “art” with
“process” in order to avoid a conflict with the meaning of the same
word in other parts of Title 35.262 In 1951, just before the passage
of the Patent Act of 1952, the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) was in “accord” in In re Abrams263 with
three “suggested ‘rules of law’”264 for addressing mental steps in
statutory subject matter. The rules were proposed by the appellant,
whose patent application for a “Petroleum Prospecting Method”
was rejected by the Board of Appeals in the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The rules were:
1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely
mental in character, the subject matter thereof is not
patentable within the meaning of the patent statutes.

260

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
262
As stated in the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952:
Section 101 follows the wording of the existing statute as to the
subject matter for patents, except that reference to plant patents has
been omitted for incorporation in section 301 and the word ‘art’ has
been replaced by ‘process,’ which is defined in section 100. The
word ‘art’ in the corresponding section of the existing statute has a
different meaning than the same word as used in other places in the
statute; it has been interpreted by the courts as being practically
synonymous with process or method. ‘Process’ has been used as its
meaning is more readily grasped than ‘art’ as interpreted, and the
definition in section 100(b) makes it clear that ‘process or method’ is
meant.
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2409–10 (1952).
263
In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
264
Id. at 167 (“From such examination of the decisions as we have been able to make,
the suggested rules appear to accord with them . . . .”).
261
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2. If a method claim embodies both positive and
physical steps as well as so-called mental steps, yet
the alleged novelty or advance over the art resides
in one or more of the so-called mental steps, then
the claim is considered unpatentable for the same
reason that it would be if all the steps were purely
mental in character.
3. If a method claim embodies both positive and
physical steps, as well as so-called mental steps, yet
the novelty or advance over the art resides in one or
more of the positive and physical steps and the socalled mental step or steps are incidental parts of the
process which are essential to define, qualify or
limit its scope, then the claim is patentable and not
subject to the objection contained in 1 and 2
above.265
The court held that the “advance in the art” of the claimed sixstep method of Abrams was that of “comparing data” and,
therefore, the process fell into the second “rule,” as opposed to the
third, as advocated by the appellants.266
In In re Prater,267 the CCPA addressed a case of first
impression268 and affirmed a decision by the Board of Appeals
rejecting method claims directed to “processing, or analysis, of
conventionally obtained spectrographic data.”269 According to the
court, “[w]hether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes
within the bounds of ‘process’ as used in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 and 101
is, we feel, an issue which has never been squarely decided.”270
The Prater court, however, refrained from stating that patentable
processes must have physical application, and attempted to explain
Supreme Court precedent, namely Cochrane,271 which the court

265

Id. at 166.
Id. at 170. (“[I]t seems to us that they are eliminated from the applicability of
appellants proposed rule 3, and fall within No. 2.”).
267
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
268
Id. at 1401.
269
Id. at 1395.
270
Id. at 1402 n.23.
271
94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
266
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quoted, in part: “A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced
to a different state or thing.”272 Specifically, the court in Prater
disputed any categorical limitation by the Supreme Court in
Cochrane on qualification of “processes” as statutory subject
matter that limits the means by which they are carried out:
This passage [from Cochrane] has sometimes been
misconstrued as a “rule” or “definition” requiring
that all processes, to be patentable, must operate
physically upon substances.
Such a result
misapprehends the nature of the passage quoted as
dictum, in its context, and the question being
discussed by the author of the opinion. To deduce
such a rule from the statement would be contrary to
its intendment which was not to limit process
patentability but to point out that a process is not
limited to the means used in performing it.273
The Supreme Court, according to the court in Prater, did not
preclude a sequence of purely mental steps from qualifying as
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.274 Earlier cases,
such as Abrams,275 which denied patent eligibility, were
distinguished as being confined to processes, or “the critical step
thereof” that “required the use of the human mind—indeed, a
purely mental process or step,” whereas the claimed method in
Prater could be practiced either by mental steps or without human
intervention.276 In other words, a method claim will not be barred
from 35 U.S.C. § 101 protection under the “mental steps” doctrine
272

Prater, 415 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788).
Id. at 1403.
274
Id. at 1402 n.23 (“Whether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes within
the bounds of ‘process’ as used in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 and 101 is, we feel, an issue which
has never been squarely decided.”).
275
In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
276
Prater, 415 F.2d at 1402 (“But, as appellants point out, ‘Yuan’s disclosure was the
use made of equations by pencil-and-paper with the mind of the operator at work to
interpret the results.’ Again, as in Abrams, insofar as the disclosure was concerned, the
process (or the critical step thereof) was one that required the use of the human mind—
indeed, a purely mental process or step.”).
273
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despite the fact that it consists of a sequence of purely mental
steps, so long as the method does not exclude, and the specification
supports, mechanical substitution of the entire method. The court
summarized: “[I]t would appear that the disclosure of apparatus for
performing the process wholly without human intervention merely
shows that the disclosed process does not fall within the so-called
‘mental steps’ exclusion.”277
b) Technological Arts
Judge Rich for the CCPA, in In re Musgrave,278 reiterated
Prater’s reasoning and more broadly stated that “novelty and
advancement of an art are irrelevant to . . . whether the nature of a
process is such that it is encompassed by the meaning of ‘process’
in 35 U.S.C. § 101.”279 The only requirement provided by Judge
Rich for qualification as a “process” under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that
it be directed to the “technological arts”: “All that is necessary, in
our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory
‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological
arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to
promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’”280 However, Judge Rich did
not specify what was meant by the term “technological arts.”
Further, Judge Rich noted that Don Lee,281 which was the genesis
of the “mental steps” concept of patent law, provided only “an
uncertain basis as precedent” for this holding.282 Rich also stated

277

Id. at 1403.
In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A 1970).
279
Id. at 889–90. The court referred to an article from the Journal of the Patent Office
Society reciting “peculiarly human mental activities” that would exclude, at least in
principle, assistance “by devices.” See id. at 890 n.4 (quoting Robert I. Coulter, The Field
of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 417, 426 (1952)). Such activities
included “aesthetic, emotional, imaginative, or a creative thought or reactions on the part
of the practitioners (operators).” Id. (quoting Coulter, supra, at 426). Further, with
respect to the technological “mental steps” cases, “the article stated that, ‘[n]one of the
them involve human ‘value judgments’—that is, judgments on human conduct, ethics,
morals, economics, politics, law, aesthetics, etc.’” See id. (quoting Coulter, supra, at
426).
280
Musgrave, 431 F.2d. at 893.
281
See Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932).
282
See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 889.
278
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that the so-called “‘Rules’ of Abrams . . . have never enjoyed the
approval of this court.”283
c) Machine-or-Transformation
A method for converting numerals from “binary-coded decimal
numbers” to “pure binary numbers” was held by the Supreme
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson284 to be unpatentable as an
“algorithm”285 that “can be carried out in existing computers long
in use, no new machinery being necessary [and] can also be
performed without a computer.”286 The Court quoted Cochrane,287
stating that “a process may be patentable, irrespective of the
particular form of the instrumentalities used,”288 but added that
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or
a thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does
not include particular machines.”289 The Court refrained from
holding that “a process patent must either be tied to a particular
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or
materials to a ‘different state or thing,’”290 and specifically denied
they were precluding patent protection for any computer-servicing
program.291 However, with respect to the applicant’s method, the
Court held that the “practical effect” would be to “patent an idea,”
which “would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and . . .
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”292

283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Id.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 67.
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88).
Id. at 70 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88).
Id. at 71. Justice Douglas, for the Court, stated:
It is argued that a patent process must either be tied to a particular
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials
to a “different state or thing.” We do not hold that no process patent
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents.

Id.
291

See id. (“It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a
computer. We do not so hold.”).
292
Id. at 71–72.
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2. Algorithms, Abstract Ideas, Naturally-Occurring
Phenomena and “Post-Solution Activity”
The CCPA developed the Benson holding into a two-step test
in In re Freeman.293 There, the patent was directed to a system for
printing mathematical formulae that positioned “mathematical
symbols in an expression in accordance with their appearance,
while maintaining the mathematical integrity of the expression.”294
The court reasoned:
Determination of whether a claim preempts
nonstatutory subject matter as a whole, in the light
of Benson, requires a two-step analysis. First, it
must be determined whether the claim directly or
indirectly recites an “algorithm” in the Benson
sense of that term, for a claim which fails even to
recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt
an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further
analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it
wholly preempts that algorithm.295
Both apparatus and method claims of the patent were upheld as
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because neither the
“apparatus claims nor the . . . method claims recite or preempt a
mathematical algorithm as forbidden by Benson.”296
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court again took up the issue
of statutory subject matter in Parker v. Flook.297 Justice Stevens
for the Court held that a method for updating alarm limits during
catalytic conversion processes was not patentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.298 Justice Stevens stated that “we assume the respondent’s
formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it.”299
However, Justice Stevens warned that “post-solution activity,”
such as computing an updated alarm limit, “no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1247.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
See id. at 594–95.
Id. at 588.
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principle into a patentable process [and, therefore] exalts form over
substance.”300 The Court refuted the assumption that “if a process
application implements a principle in some specific fashion, it
automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of §
101.”301 Instead, the Court stated that “[t]he rule that the discovery
of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that
natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of
‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”302 Otherwise,
according to the Court, “determination of patentable subject matter
[would] depend simply on the draftsman’s art and would ill serve
the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ‘ideas’
or phenomena of nature.”303
Further, the Court did not view its analysis to be one of
dissection of claimed subject matter, whereby “if the only
component found novel is outside the statutory classes of
invention, the claim may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”304
The claimed method would be unpatentable under section 101 “not
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component,
but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention.”305 Nevertheless, “[e]ven though a phenomenon of
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive
application of the principle may be patented.”306 Therefore,
qualification of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, for
the Court, depended upon “inventive application”307 of principle,
and claimed subject matter might fail the test despite the fact that
the novel application of a formula discovered by an applicant is
useful. The Court stated: “Very simply, our holding today is that a

300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Id. at 590.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594 (quoting In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”308
Three justices—including Chief Justice Burger—dissented
from the majority opinion. Justice Stewart, for the dissent, stated
that the majority confused issues of qualification as statutory
subject matter patentability with issues of novelty and
inventiveness under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103:
The Court today says it does not turn its back on
well-settled precedents . . . but it strikes what seems
to me an equally damaging blow at basic principles
of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and
inventiveness. Section 101 is concerned only with
subject-matter patentability. Whether a patent will
actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102
and 103, which include novelty and inventiveness,
among many others.309
The CCPA in In re Sarkar310 held that a method for
“mathematically modeling an open channel, e.g., a natural stream
or artificial waterway”311 was not a “process” within the meaning
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 because an “algorithm” in the claim reduced
the “invention as a whole” to a “mathematical exercise.”312
Physical steps of “gathering and substituting values” for the
algorithm would, according to the court, cause “every
mathematical equation, formula, or algorithm having any practical
use . . . [to] be per se subject to patenting as a ‘process’ under §

308
309
310
311
312

Id.

Id. at 595 n.18.
Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id. at 1330.
See id. at 1336. The court stated:
Sarkar’s claimed invention as a whole consists of a mathematical
exercise, wherein a new formula is provided, formula-dictated values
are gathered and substituted for the variables in that formula, and the
calculations required by the formula are made. Sarkar’s offer to
disclose his process by patenting must, in the present state of the law,
be declined.
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101.”313 For the court, “substitution of specific values” was
inadequate to “convert disembodied ideas . . . into an embodiment
of those ideas, or into an application of the formula.”314
The CCPA affirmed a rejection by the Board of Appeals under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims directed to a “computer-implemented
model of a sales organization” in In re Maucorps.315 Applying
Freeman’s two-step method of determining (1) “whether the claim
directly or indirectly recites an ‘algorithm’ in the Benson sense of
that term” and (2) “whether [the claim] in its entirety . . . wholly
preempts that algorithm,”316 the court held that the “claimed
invention as a whole comprises each and every means for carrying
out a solution technique for a set of equations wherein one number
is computed from a set of numbers.”317 Therefore, “appellant’s
claims wholly preempt the recited algorithms.”318 Whether the
claim was directed to a method or an apparatus was considered
immaterial by the court.319
On the other hand, in In re Sherwood,320 the C.C.PA. reversed
a rejection by the Board of Appeals of another application directed
to “geophysical prospecting.”321 What the board viewed as
“mathematically converting one set of numbers into a new set of
numbers,”322 the court found to be conversion of “physical
apparitions, or particular patterns of magnetization on magnetic
tape, i.e., the pattern of magnetization being a physical
manifestation, or a physical line on a paper chart”323 from
“amplitude-versus-time” seismic traces to “amplitude-versus-

313

Id. at 1335.
Id.
315
In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
316
Id. at 485 n.2 (quoting In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
317
Id. at 486.
318
Id.
319
See id. at 485 (“Labels are not determinative in § 101 inquiries. ‘Benson applies
equally whether an invention is claimed as an apparatus or process, because the form of
the claim is often an exercise in drafting.’”) (quoting In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077
(C.C.P.A. 1978)).
320
In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
321
Id. at 811.
322
Id. at 818.
323
Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
314
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depth” traces.324 The court held that the claimed system converted
“one physical thing into another physical thing just as any other
electrical circuitry would do,”325 and, therefore, more than “mere
methods (or means) for solving mathematical equations.”326
In re Walter327 was another case where the CCPA addressed
the patentability of “seismic prospecting and surveying.”328 Judge
Rich incorporated “scientific truth,” or “principle,” into the second
step of the Freeman test, which hinged on preemption of a
“mathematical algorithm” identified within claimed subject matter,
thereby redefining that test in a manner that embraced both
apparatus and process claims:
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the
claim as a whole must be further analyzed. If it
appears that the mathematical algorithm is
implemented in a specific manner to define
structural relationships between the physical
elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to
refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the
claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes
muster under § 101.329
The redefined second step of the Freeman test was contrasted
with “post-solution activity” or recitation of “field of use,” which
presumably would not limit apparatus or process elements by the
manner in which a “mathematical algorithm” is implemented:
If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely
presented and solved by the claimed invention, as
was the case in Benson and Flook, and is not
applied in any manner to physical elements or
process steps, no amount of post-solution activity
will render the claim statutory; nor is it saved by a

324
325
326
327
328
329

Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 767.
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preamble merely reciting the field of use of the
mathematical algorithm.330
Consistent with Judge Rich’s earlier pronouncements, a correct
determination of statutory subject matter employing algorithms,
mathematical formulas or scientific truth was not contingent on
whether the subject matter, as claimed, was drafted as a process or
apparatus, but rather it hinged on whether the claimed subject
matter resulted in more than solution of a mathematical algorithm.
In a landmark decision by the Supreme Court, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty,331 the Court appeared to blend qualification as
statutory subject matter with the other statutory requirements of
novelty and utility.
There, a “live, human-made micro332
organism” was held to be patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter”333
under the terms of that statute.334 The Court explicitly rejected the
argument that the 1930 Plant Patent Act335 and the 1970 Plant
Variety Protection Act336 excluded protection for human-made
microorganisms under 35 U.S.C. § 101.337 The Court also refuted
the notion that qualification of micro-organisms as patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would require express
authorization from Congress.338 Neither was the Court swayed by
the “gruesome parade of horribles” presented as a potential
consequence of providing patent protection to man-made living
organisms.339 Instead, the Court construed the 1952 Patent Act
broadly, because “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent
laws would be given wide scope,”340 in order to advance
“Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal
330

Id. (emphasis added).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
332
Id. at 305.
333
See id. at 312.
334
See id. at 318.
335
Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245. 46 Stat. 376 (repealed 1952).
336
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2006)).
337
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311.
338
Id. at 315 (“Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not
contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se.”).
339
Id. at 316.
340
Id. at 308.
331
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encouragement.’”341 The Court invoked the legislative history of
the 1952 Patent Act and P.J. Federico’s testimony: “[U]nder
section 101 a person may have invented a machine or a
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is
made by man.”342
The Court went further, however, and appeared, at least, to
blend qualification as statutory subject matter with other statutory
requirements, namely, the novelty and utility requirements, which
are separate from classification as a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Specifically, the Court stated that “[h]is claim is not to a hitherto
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”343
Funk Bros. was distinguished on the basis of “markedly different
characteristics” of Chakrabarty’s micro-organism from that
occurring in nature, further reinforcing the idea of patent eligibility
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a function of novelty:
Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics
from any found in nature and one having potential
for significant utility. His discovery is not nature’s
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable
subject matter under § 101.344
Next, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr345 addressed
qualification under § 101 and seemed to import an enablement
requirement into the section 101 inquiry. The patent at issue was
directed at a method for operating a rubber-molding press that
included repetitively calculating the cure time and opening the
press at the time indicated by those calculations.346 The Court
341

Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76 (H. A.
Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854)).
342
Id. at 309 n.6 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951)).
343
Id. at 309–10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
344
Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
345
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
346
See id. at 178.

C04_PIERCE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2013 2:08 PM

242

[Vol. 23:186

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

upheld a decision by the CCPA to reverse the rejection by the
USPTO because “we do not view respondent’s claims as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to
an industrial process for the molding of rubber products.”347
The Court believed that it was being consistent with its earlier
holding in Flook, where calculation of an alarm limit during an
unspecified chemical reaction was held not to be patentable subject
matter, despite the fact that, as in the instant case, the claims in
Flook did not “cover every conceivable application of the
formula.”348 The distinction, according to the Court, was whether
the claim relied on “insignificant post-solution activity . . . [to]
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”349
The court further stated: “Similarly, a mathematical formula does
not become patentable subject matter merely by including in the
claim for the formula token post-solution activity such as the type
claimed in Flook.”350 The Court did not provide much guidance in
distinguishing between Flook’s “insignificant post-solution
activity” and Diehr’s “industrial process” other than to point out
that the claims at issue in Flook were not supported by an enabling
written description, which is not a requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101,
but rather the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.351 In particular,
the court stated that:
We were careful to note in Flook that the patent
application did not purport to explain how the
variables used in the formula were to be selected,
nor did the application contain any disclosure
relating to chemical processes at work or the means

347
348
349
350
351

Id.

Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 193 n.14; see supra text accompanying notes 297–309.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 193 n.14.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
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of setting off an alarm or adjusting the alarm unit.
All the application provided was a “formula for
computing an updated alarm limit.”352
Therefore, like the Flook Court, the reasoning provided by the
Court in Diehr is subject to the same type of criticism that was
made by the dissent in Flook, namely that, by basing qualification
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 on the presence or absence of “insignificant
post-solution activity,” the Court is delivering a “damaging blow at
basic principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under
35 U.S.C. § 101” other statutory requirements.353 In Flook, it was
novelty and obviousness.354 In Diehr, it was enablement. In
addition, the Court in Diehr did not reduce the criteria for
qualification under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to any general test, but instead
relied upon simply considering the claimed subject matter “as a
whole,” and reciting an example of a test that had been employed
in the past, namely, that of “[t]ransforming and reduction of an
article to a ‘different state or thing.’”355
The dissent in Diehr stated that the majority had failed to
“recognize the critical difference between the ‘discovery’
requirement in § 101 and the ‘novelty’ requirement in § 102,”356
but, in making the distinction, the dissent actually appears to have
made the same error, despite stating the contrary.357 Justice
Stevens, for the dissent, stated that with respect to the claimed
inventions of Flook and Diehr, the “post-solution activity is a
significant part of the industrial process,”358 but that “in neither
case should that activity have any legal significance because it
352
353
354

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 n.14.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See id. Justice Stewart further stated that:
It may well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent
should issue on the process claimed in this case, because of
anticipation, abandonment, obviousness, or for some other reason.
But in my view the claimed process clearly meets the standards of
subject matter patentability of § 101.

Id.
355

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
Id. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
357
See id. at 213 (“In the § 101 analysis, we must assume that the sequence of steps in
this programming method is novel, unobvious and useful.”).
358
Id. at 215.
356
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does not constitute a part of the inventive concept that the
applicants claimed to have discovered.”359 The dissent’s analysis
excluded what it believed to be non-statutory subject matter—
namely, the computer program360—and looked to the remainder of
the steps to decide the “threshold question of whether such a
method is patentable subject matter.”361 The dissent’s analysis of
Diehr’s claimed method was squarely within the realm of 35
U.S.C. § 102:
Even the Court does not suggest that the computer
program developed by Diehr and Lutton is a
patentable discovery. Accordingly, if we treat the
program as though it were a familiar part of the
prior art—as well-established precedent requires—
it is absolutely clear that their application contains
no claim of patentable invention. Their application
was therefore properly rejected under § 101 by the
Patent Office and the Board of Appeals.362
Therefore, both the majority and the dissent in Diehr appear to
have confused qualifications of subject matter as “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof,” with other requirements
under the Patent Act of 1952. The majority confused the question
of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with the
“enablement” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, while the dissent, in
criticizing the majority, also blended the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 with the novelty requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Subsequent cases at the CCPA and, later, at the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, continued to decide qualification
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by breaking claims down into their
component parts and evaluating the nature of individual steps or
components of claimed subject matter. Often, as in Flook and
Diehr, analyses by courts hinged on issues provided for in other
359

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 216 (“In Parker v. Flook, we further held that such a computer program
could not be transformed into a patentable process by the addition of postsolution activity
that was not claimed to be novel.”).
361
Id. at 213.
362
Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
360
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sections of the Patent Act, such as whether “post-solution” activity
was insignificant, which would be better addressed under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as an issue of obviousness, and whether claimed
subject matter was a “scientific truth” or “algorithm,” which is
properly an issue of novelty. Further, there appeared to be no
consistency from case to case as to whether any particular
application of a law of nature, physical phenomena or abstract idea
was sufficiently distinct from a prohibited preemption of all
applications of principle.
For example, the CCPA in In re Abele363 affirmed a rejection
by the USPTO of an independent claim directed to an
“improvement in CAT scan imaging technique”364 as “no more
than the calculation of a number and display of the result, albeit in
a particular format,”365 while also upholding a dependent claim
limiting the display of data to “X-ray attenuation data produced in
a two dimensional field by a computed tomography scanner.”366
The “X-ray attenuation data” was viewed by the court as “an
application of an algorithm to process steps which are themselves
part of an overall process which is statutory.”367 The court came to
the conclusion that the dependent claim was statutory by carving
out the algorithm and assessing the remaining components of the
claim.368
The court viewed Walter as requiring
no more than that the algorithm be “applied in any
manner to physical elements or process steps,”
provided that its application is circumscribed by
more than a field of use limitation or non-essential
post-solution activity. . . . This broad reading of

363

In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
364
Id. at 904.
365
Id. at 909.
366
Id. at 908.
367
Id. at 908–09.
368
Id. at 908 (“Were we to view the claim absent the algorithm, the production,
detection and display steps would still be present and would result in a conventional
CAT-scan process.”).
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Walter, we conclude, is in accord with the Supreme
Court decisions.369
A direct comparison was made between the permissible
dependent claim and the rubber-curing process claimed in Diehr,
and the court found that “[t]he improvement in either case resides
in the application of a mathematical formula within the context of
a process which encompasses significantly more than the algorithm
alone.”370
The two-dimensional presentation of X-ray attenuation data
was enough of a physical application to distinguish it as patentable
subject matter—in contrast to the method by which that data was
generated. In other words, physical application of the principle
represented by the algorithm resided in display of data generated
by that algorithm.
A method of diagnosis was held unpatentable in In re
Grams,371 where the Federal Circuit upheld a rejection by the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of claims directed to a
method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual as a
non-statutory algorithm, stating that the “presence of a physical
step in the claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the
claim statutory.”372 As further stated by the Court: “In all
instances, this critical question must be answered: ‘What did
applicants invent?’ . . . Though that analysis can be difficult, it is
facilitated somewhat if, as here, the only physical step involves
merely gathering data for the algorithm.”373 The court quoted In re
Sarkar: “If the steps of gathering and substituting values were
alone sufficient, every mathematical equation, formula, or
algorithm having any practical use would be per se subject to
patenting as a process under § 101.”374

369
370
371
372
373
374

Id. at 907 (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
Id. at 909.
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 840.
Id. at 839.
Id. (quoting In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
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On the other hand, in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp.,375 which involved a method of diagnosis and
associated apparatus employing electric cardiographic signals
generated by a patient, Judge Newman, for the court, viewed
“converting,” “applying,” “determining,” and “comparing” as
“physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical
signal into another” and, therefore, met the Freeman-Walter-Abele
standard.376 Grams was considered distinct in that the subject
claims in Arrhythmia were narrowly tailored to an
“electrocardiograph analysis process,” whereas the claims in
Grams “had application to ‘any complex system, whether it be
electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or combinations
thereof.’”377 The fact that the “physical process” of the claimed
electrocardiographic method and apparatus only transformed “one
physical, electrical signal into another”378 was sufficient to meet
the requirements of section 101, despite the fact that the output of
the apparatus and process was “simply a number.”379 The
Arrhythmia court reasoned that “[t]he number obtained is not a
mathematical abstraction; it is a measure in microvolts of a
specified heart activity, an indicator of the risk of ventricular
tachycardia. That the product is numerical is not a criterion of
whether the claim is directed to statutory subject matter.”380
The claimed subject matter in In re Alappat381 was directed to
an apparatus, specifically, a “rasterizer” for smoothing a waveform
display in a digital oscilloscope.382 Judge Rich reversed a rejection
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for lack of
statutory subject matter under section 101,383 and held that the
subject matter of the claimed apparatus, which was expressed in
375

Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
376
See id. at 1059 (“The Freeman-Walter-Abele standard is met, for the steps of
Simson’s claimed method comprise an otherwise statutory process whose mathematical
procedures are applied to physical process steps.”).
377
Id. (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 840).
378
Id.
379
Id. at 1060.
380
Id.
381
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
382
Id. at 1544.
383
See id. at 1545.
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terms of “means-plus-function,”384 met the statutory requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it did not “‘wholly preempt’ the use of
any apparatus employing the combination of mathematical
calculations recited therein,”385 but rather was “limited to the use
of a particularly claimed combination of elements performing the
particularly claimed combination of calculations to transform, i.e.,
rasterize, digitized waveforms (data) into anti-aliased, pixel
illumination data to produce a smooth waveform.”386 Thus,
despite the fact that the claim “would read on a general purpose
computer programmed to carry out the claimed invention,”387
according to Judge Rich, “a computer, like a rasterizer, is
apparatus not mathematics.”388 The test for preemption for the
Alappat court was whether there was a “useful, concrete and
tangible result.”389
Judge Archer delivered an extended dissent in which he
relayed an abbreviated history of the development of the section
101 requirements. Ultimately, however, Judge Archer concluded
that the claimed rasterizer “is simply the mathematical conversion
of data”390 that “is not even limited to the environment of an
oscilloscope.”391 Judge Archer stated that the attempt by the
majority to find physical application of a principle masked the true
nature of the invention: “[A]s a whole, there is no ‘application’
apart from the mathematical operation that is asserted to be the
invention or discovery. What is going on here is a charade.”392
Judge Archer stated, in short: “As the player piano playing new
music is not the stuff of patent law, neither is the mathematics that
is Alappat’s ‘rasterizer.’”393
384

Id. at 1542.
Id. at 1544.
386
Id.
387
Id. at 1545.
388
Id.
389
Id. at 1544 (“This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to produce a useful,
concrete, and tangible result.”).
390
Id. at 1564 (Archer, J., dissenting).
391
Id.
392
Id. at 1563–64.
393
Id. at 1568. Particularly striking, in view of his reasoning in Alappat, is the fact that
the following year Judge Archer, in In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
385
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C. Crashing the Palace
1. State Street Bank and Beyond
Shortly before retiring from the bench, Judge Rich decided to
follow Alappat rather than the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. In
State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group,394 he
reversed and remanded a summary judgment by the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts that held invalid a
patent entitled “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke
Financial Services Configuration” under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As
stated by Judge Rich, the claimed system “facilitates a structure
whereby mutual funds (Spokes) pool their assets in an investment
portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership . . . [which] provides the
administrator of a mutual fund with the advantageous combination
of economies of scale in administering investments coupled with
the tax advantages of a partnership.”395 In holding that the patent
claims were directed to statutory subject matter, Judge Rich
cautioned against reading limitations into section 101, such as
“mathematical algorithm”396 and “business method”397 exceptions
where “the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did
not intend such limitations.”398 He dismissed the test developed
under Freeman-Walter-Abele as having “little, if any, applicability
to determining the presence of statutory subject matter” following
the decisions in Diehr and Chakrabarty.399 Instead, Judge Rich
relied on Alappat, which distinguished a non-statutory
“disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized
as an ‘abstract idea,’”400 from a statutory “specific machine to
issued an order vacating a decision by the Board rejecting computer-product claims
because the Commissioner of the U.S.P.T.O. conceded “that computer programs
embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” See id. at
1584.
394
State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
395
Id. at 1370.
396
Id. at 1372.
397
Id.
398
Id. at 1373.
399
See id. at 1374.
400
See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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produce a useful, concrete and tangible result.”401 For Judge Rich,
the claimed system of managing mutual funds fell squarely within
the latter category:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data,
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine
through a series of mathematical calculations into a
final share price, constitutes a practical application
of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
calculation, because it produces “a useful, concrete
and tangible result”—a final share price
momentarily fixed for recording and reporting
purposes and even accepted and relied upon by
regulatory authorities in subsequent trades.402
Exclusion from section 101 as a “business method” exception
also was dismissed by Judge Rich as having “never been invoked
by this court, or the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable.”403
As he had stated in several previous decisions, Judge Rich
believed that enumeration of subject matter of a claim under any
particular category within section 101 was not of great
significance, “as long as it falls within at least one of the four
enumerated categories of patentable subject matter.”404 For Judge
Rich, then, “[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are
identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting
disembodied concepts or truths that are not ‘useful.’ From a
practical standpoint, this means that to be patentable an algorithm
must be applied in a ‘useful’ way.”405
Judge Rich did not explain, however, how the “final share of
price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes”
constituted “concrete,” “tangible” or “useful” results, nor did he
provide any limitation on patentable subject matter other than the
broad categories listed in section 101. Under Judge Rich’s
interpretation, which essentially disregards all judicial

401
402
403
404
405

See id.
State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1373.
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interpretation of statutes governing the scope of statutory subject
matter since the Patent Act of 1793 other than the prohibition
against grant of exclusive rights to naturally occurring principles
per se, the breadth of potentially patentable subject matter is
almost boundless. For example, without being tethered by some
physical application of naturally occurring principle, to grant
exclusive rights to “anything under the sun that is made by man”406
explodes all previous categorizations—such as printed matter,
mental steps, or anything else that might be viewed as man’s
handiwork—so long as it could be considered “useful” in some
sense.407 Examples of such areas might well include not only socalled “methods of doing business,” but other fields not previously
viewed as within the scope of patent protection: forms of
government, religion, morality, ethics, art, and so on. In sum, any
form of human expression or control could be classified as a
machine or process under 35 U.S.C. § 101. After State Street
Bank, decisions regarding the scope of statutory eligibility became
more frequent and increasingly erratic.
Justice Breyer, for example, along with Justices Stevens and
Souter, in dissent from dismissal of a writ of certiorari of an appeal
from the Federal Circuit in Laboratory Corp. of America v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,408 stated that a claimed method for
detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded
animals fell outside of § 101 because, by requiring that one
practicing a method need only “(1) obtain test results and (2) think
about them,”409 the claim constituted an “improper effort to obtain
patent protection for a law of nature.”410 Justice Breyer did not
consider the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test of State
Street to be controlling, both because it had never been invoked by
the Supreme Court and because “if taken literally, the statement

406

See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 n.6 (1981) (quoting Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951)).
407
See supra text accompanying note 73–83 (regarding notions of “usefulness” as
understood at the time the Constitution was written).
408
Lab. Corp. of America v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
409
Id. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
410
Id. at 131.
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would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary,”411
such as the “use of electromagnetic current for transmitting
messages over long distances” in Morse,412 “triggering alarm limits
in connection with catalytic conversion” in Flook,413 and
transforming, “for computer-programming purposes, decimal
figures into binary figures” in Gottschalk v. Benson,414 despite
their apparent utility.415
The Federal Circuit in In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten416 held that
a claim to a “signal” for embedding “watermarks” into electronic
files such as digital audio files was not statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it did not fall within any of the four
enumerated statutory categories listed—i.e., “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.”417 In essence, the court
held that signals are not “an act or series of acts” and, therefore,
not a “process”418 and not a “composition of matter” because a
“signal [comprises] a fluctuation in electrical potential or in
electromagnetic fields” and, therefore, “is not a ‘chemical union’
nor a gas, fluid, powder, or solid.”419 Further, although signals are
physical, they are “transitory embodiments”420 and, consequently,
not a “machine”421 or a “manufacture”422 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421

Id. at 136.
See supra text accompanying notes 203–19.
See supra text accompanying notes 297–308.
See supra text accompanying notes 284–92.
See Lab Corp., 548 U.S. at 136–37.
In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
See id. at 1357.
See id. at 1355
See id. at 1357.
See id. at 1353.
See id. at 1355.
The Supreme Court has defined the term ‘machine’ as a ‘concrete
thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of
devices.’ Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863). . . . A
transitory signal made of electrical or electromagnetic variances is
not made of ‘parts’ or ‘devices’ in any mechanical sense. While such
a signal is physical and real, it does not possess concrete structure in
the sense implied by these definitions.

Id.
422

See id. at 1356 (“These definitions address ‘articles’ of ‘manufacture’ as being
tangible articles or commodities. A transient electric or electromagnetic transmission
does not fit within that definition.”).
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Acting en banc in In re Comisky,423 the Federal Circuit held as
ineligible for patent protection claims directed to a method and
system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents if they
“depend entirely on the use of mental processes.”424 The court
reasoned that “it is established that the application of human
intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of
itself patentable.”425 Claims that recited “under the broadest
reasonable interpretation . . . use of a machine”—such as a
“registration module,” “arbitration module,” an “arbitration
resolution module,” or access to “the Internet, intranet, World
Wide Web, software applications, telephone, television, cable
video [or radio], magnetic, electronic communication, or other
communication means”—were remanded to the Patent Office for
consideration under 35 U.S.C. § 101.426
The Federal Circuit in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Services (Prometheus I)427 upheld as statutory
subject matter methods of optimizing “therapeutic efficacy for
treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”428 At
issue in Prometheus were claimed diagnostic tests for determining
whether subsequent administration of either of two drugs—
namely, 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP) or a prodrug for 6-MP,
azathiopurine—employed to treat inflammatory bowel diseases
such as Crohn’s Disease and ulcerative colitis should be increased
or decreased.429 Independent claims included the method steps of
administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, followed by
determining the level of 6-thioguanine or 6-MP, both of which
were metabolites of the therapeutic drugs, to determine if
subsequent doses of those drugs should be increased or
decreased.430 One independent claim included only the step of
423

In re Comisky, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
See id. at 980.
425
Id.
426
See id. at 981.
427
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs.(Prometheus I) 581 F.3d 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
428
Id. at 1340.
429
See id. at 1339.
430
See id.
424
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determining the level of metabolites in a subject to which the drug
had been administered.431 Since the drugs and their utility were
known, the claimed novelty lay in the criteria provided in the claim
for determining whether subsequent doses should be increased or
decreased.432
Referring to its own decision in Bilski,433 as well as the
Supreme Court decision in Diehr, the Federal Circuit in
Prometheus I stated on appeal:
[I]t has . . . been established that “while a claim
drawn to a fundamental principle”—i.e., a law of
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea—“is
unpatentable, ‘an application of law or
mathematical formula to a known structure or
process may well be deserving of patent
prosecution.’”434
The Court further stated that the “key issue for patentability,
then, at least on the present facts, is whether a claim is drawn to a
fundamental principle or an application of a fundamental
principle.”435 The “machine-or-transformation” test articulated in
Bilski “must be central to the purpose of the claimed process”436 as
opposed to “insignificant extra-solution activity” or a “datagathering step.”437
The court found transformation to inhere in the administration
of the drugs to the patient according to the method of the claim438
and, independently, in the “determining step.”439 According to the
court, “[s]ome form of manipulation, such as the high pressure
liquid chromatography method specified in several of the asserted
431

See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col.23 l.41 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); see also Prometheus
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 F.3d 1347, 1350–51 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
432
See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1340.
433
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010).
434
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953).
435
Id.
436
Id. at 1342–43 (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–62).
437
Id. (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–63).
438
See id. at 1346.
439
Id. at 1347.
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dependent claims or other modification of the substances to be
measured, is necessary to extract the metabolites from a bodily
sample and determine their concentration.”440 The administration
and determination step was found to be “central to the claims
rather than merely insignificant extra-solution activity.”441
The court distinguished Prometheus’ claimed therapeutic
methods from those at issue in In re Grams442 on the basis that the
clinical tests conducted in Grams were not “transformative.”443
According to the Court in Prometheus I, Grams held unpatentable
claims that included “(1) performing a clinical test on individuals
and (2) based on the data from that test, determining if an
abnormality existed and determining possible causes of any
abnormality by using an algorithm.”444 The Grams process “was
merely an algorithm combined with a data gathering step.”445 The
Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the final step in
each of Prometheus’ claimed methods were mental steps and “thus
not patent eligible per se,”446 but stated that the “addition of the
mental steps to the claimed methods does not remove the prior two
steps” from the realm of statutory subject matter.447 Applying the
question posed by the Grams court—“what did the applicant
invent?”448—to the facts in Prometheus I, the Federal Circuit stated
that “the answer is a series of transformative steps that optimizes
efficacy and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for
particular diseases using particular drugs.”449 The court was
careful to assert, however, that “it is improper to consider whether

440

Id.
Id. (“Mayo is correct that not all of the asserted claims contain the administering
step. That omission, which occurs in claims 46 and 53 of the ’623 patent, does not
diminish the patentability of the claimed methods because the determining step, which is
present in each of the asserted claims is also transformative and central to the claimed
methods.”).
442
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes
371–74.
443
See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1347.
444
Id. at 1348.
445
Id. (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 840).
446
See id.
447
See id.
448
Id. at 1349 (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 839).
449
Id. at 1349.
441
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a claimed element or step in a process is novel or non-obvious,
since such considerations are separate requirements set forth in 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, respectively.”450
2. Bilski v. Kappos: “Restoring . . . [an] . . . Historical State
of Rest”451
In Bilski v. Kappos,452 the Supreme Court upheld decisions of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office453 and United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit454 that the claimed
subject matter of U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, entitled
“Energy Risk Management Method,” filed April 10, 1997, was not
eligible for protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.455 The application
included eleven claims directed to a “method for managing the
consumption of risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity
provider at a fixed price.”456
450

Id. at 1343.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he
opinion for the Court explains—correctly—that the Court is merely restoring the law to
its historical state of rest.”) (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227).
452
Id. at 3218.
453
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
454
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
455
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3213, 3231 (2010).
456
Claim 1 is representative and reads:
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a
commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising
the steps of:
(a)initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said
consumer;
(b)identifying market participants for said commodity having a
counter-risk position to said consumers; and
(c)initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that
said series of market participant transactions balances the risk
position of said series of consumer transactions.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010 ) (No. 08964). Claim 4, the only other independent claim, applied the same concept more
specifically to a “method for managing weather related energy price risk costs by an
energy provider at a fixed price,” and applies a specific mathematic formula. See id. at 7–
8.
451
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The questions presented on appeal to the Supreme Court were:
(1) “[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a ‘process’
must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a
particular article into a different state or thing (‘machine-ortransformation’ test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. §
101;” and (2) “[w]hether the Federal Circuit’s ‘machine-ortransformation’ test for patent eligibility . . . contradicts the clear
Congressional intent that patents protect ‘method[s] of doing or
conducting business.’”457
With respect to the first question, the Court held that the
Federal Circuit did err by holding that a “process” must be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article
into a different state or thing to be eligible for patenting under 35
U.S.C. § 101.458 Without directly answering the second question
presented on appeal, the Court further stated that, “[i]n the course
of applying a machine-or-transformation test to emerging
technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy and
refinement that they risk obscuring the larger object of securing
patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public
domain.”459 Moreover, the Court did not preclude application of
the machine-or-transformation test to any statutory category of
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but did state that articulation
in 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) of a “method of doing or conducting
457
The complete questions as they appear in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari are as
follows:
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must
be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular
article into a different state or thing (“machine-or-transformation”
test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, despite this
Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad statutory grant of
patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process beyond excluding
patents for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”
Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test
for patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent
protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear
Congressional intent that patents protect “method(s) of doing or
conducting business.”
Id. at i (citing 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006)).
458
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (“The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”).
459
Id.
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business,”460 means that, “at least in some circumstances,”461
business methods are eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
although “it does not suggest broad patentability of such claimed
inventions.”462
Relying on the Supreme Court precedent463 excepting “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”464 from patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Court held that the “concept
of hedging described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical
formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea”465 and,
therefore, ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.466 According to the
Court, “[a]llowing petitioner to patent risk hedging would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant
a monopoly over an abstract idea.”467 Having excluded the Federal
Circuit’s use of the “machine-or-transformation” test as the sole
criteria for patent eligibility, the Court nevertheless was careful to
state that “nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing
interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has used in the past,”468 and that the Court “by no means
foreclose[s] the Federal Circuit’s development of other limiting
criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not
inconsistent with its text.”469
Justice Stevens, in his last opinion before retiring from the
bench, concurred in the result, but was sharply critical of the
reasoning employed by the majority. For him, the Court’s opinion
was “less than pellucid in more than one respect, and, if
misunderstood, could result in confusion or upset settled areas of
the law.”470 Specifically, Justice Stevens disagreed with the
460

See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘method’ means a method of doing or
conducting business.”).
461
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
462
Id. at 3229.
463
See id.
464
Id. at 3225.
465
Id. at 3231.
466
See id. (“In light of these precedents, it is clear that petitioner’s application is not a
patentable ‘process.’”).
467
Id.
468
Id.
469
Id.
470
See id. at 3234 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Court’s reliance on 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) for a definition of
“process,”471 which he characterized as “somewhat circular.”472 A
logical consequence of the Court’s reliance on the statutory
definition, in Justice Stevens’ thinking, would be to consider
patentable “any series of steps or any way to do any thing,” which
the 1952 Patent Act was “neither intended nor understood to
encompass.”473 Prohibiting abstract ideas, laws of nature “and the
like,”474 was not, for Justice Stevens, an adequate bulwark against
many processes that would be eligible for patent prosecution, such
as a “process for training a dog, a series of dance steps, a method
of shooting a basketball, maybe even words, stories or songs,
framed as the steps of typing letters or uttering sounds.”475
Justice Stevens further criticized the majority for imputing
from the definition of process that the American Inventors
Protection Act “acknowledges that there may be business method
patents.”476 Rather, Stevens asserted that the “1999 Act was
passed to limit the impact of the Federal Circuit’s then-recent
statements on the 1952 Act,”477 referring to Judge Rich’s
comments, in dicta, in State Street Bank.478 The paradoxical effect
of the majority’s reasoning, according to Stevens, is that, “[i]f,
tomorrow, Congress were to conclude that patents on business
methods are so important that the special infringement defense in §
273 ought to be abolished . . . [this would] strengthen the case
against such patents because there would no longer be a § 273 that
‘acknowledges . . . business method patents.’”479 With respect to
the “sole issue presented to us,”480 Justice Stevens stated that, in
471
See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (“When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates .
. . [t]he term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacturer, composition of matter, or material”).
472
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3237 (Stevens, J., concurring).
473
Id.
474
Id. at 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
475
Id. at 3238. (Stevens, J., concurring).
476
Id. at 3251 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion).
477
Id.
478
State St. Bank & Trust Co., v. Signature Fin. Grp. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“The business method exception has never been invoked by this court, or the
C.C.P.A., to deem an invention unpatentable.”).
479
Bilski, 130 S. Ct at 3252 (Stevens, J., concurring).
480
Id. at 3235.
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striking down the machine-or-transformation test as the sole
criterion for patent eligibility, “the Court is merely restoring the
law to its historical state of rest,”481 and “that the machine-ortransformation test remains an important test for patentability.”482
Justice Stevens also was critical of the Court’s failure to
provide “a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable
abstract idea”483 and, as a consequence, despite a “correct
outcome,”484 concluded that the “court’s musings on this issue
stand for very little.”485 He stated that, in view of the history of the
development of British and American patent law, and the
“constitutionally mandated purpose and function of the patent
laws,”486 despite the fact that business methods might be “useful
for encouraging innovation and disclosure, it would still be
questionable whether they would, on balance, facilitate or impede
the progress of American business.”487 Acknowledging that
methods of doing business are ineligible for patent protection
under section 101 would, according to Justice Stevens, “be a far
more sensible and restrained way to resolve”488 the issues
presented in Bilski. Justice Stevens concluded by stating that,
“while I confirm the judgment, I strongly disagree with the court’s
disposition of this case.”489 Justices Breyer and Scalia concurred
with Justice Stevens’ opinion “in full” in a separate opinion.490
3. The “Historical State of Rest” Since Bilski
Cases decided since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski
seem minimally affected by the outcome in Bilski. The first such
case, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
481

Id..
Id.
483
Id. at 3236
484
Id
485
See id.
486
Id. at 3252.
487
Id. at 3255.
488
Id. at 3257.
489
Id.
490
Id. at 3257–58 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This Court has never before held that socalled ‘business methods’ are patentable, and, in my view, the test, history, and purpose
of the Patent Act make clear that they are not. I would therefore decide this case on that
ground, and I join Justice Stevens’ opinion in full.”).
482
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Services (Prometheus II),491 was decided by the Federal Circuit on
remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light of
Bilski. As discussed above,492 prior to remand, the Federal Circuit
in Prometheus I had applied the “machine-or-transformation test,”
which was considered at the time to be the “definitive test”493 for
determining whether a process is patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101, and held that both the “administering”494 and
“determining”495 steps in the claimed diagnostic method of
Prometheus were transformative. As a consequence, the Federal
Circuit reversed496 the district court’s decision, which held the
claims to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as wholly preempting
use of the “natural phenomena” of “correlations between, on the
one hand, thiopurine drug metabolite levels and, on the other hand,
efficacy and toxicity.”497
On remand, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus II acknowledged
the Supreme Court’s refusal in Bilski to adopt the “machine-ortransformation test” as the sole test for determining patent
eligibility and quoted the Court’s assertion that “while a law of
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea cannot be patented,
‘an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a
491

Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
See supra text accompanying notes 433–50.
493
See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543
(2010). The court stated:
The key issue for patentability, then, at least on the present facts, is
whether a claim is drawn to a fundamental principle or an application
of a fundamental principle. Although this inquiring is hardly
straightforward, following the Supreme Court, we articulated in
Bilski a “definitive test” for determining whether a process is patenteligible under § 101: “A claimed process is surely patent eligible
under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”
Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
494
See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70
(1972)) (“The administering step, therefore, is not merely data-gathering but a significant
transformative element of Prometheus’s claimed methods of treatment that is ‘sufficiently
definite to confine the patent monopoly.’”).
495
See id. at 1347 (“The determining step, by working a chemical and physical
transformation on physical substances, likewise sufficiently confines the patent
monopoly, as required by Bilski.”).
496
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1350.
497
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1341.
492
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known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.’”498 The Federal Circuit also highlighted the Supreme
Court’s statement in Diehr that it is “inappropriate to dissect the
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence
of the old elements in the analysis,”499 while concluding that
“[n]onetheless, a scientific principle cannot be made patentable by
limiting its use to a particular technological environment or by
adding insignificant post-solution activity.”500
Applying these principles to the claimed methods of
“optimizing therapeutic efficacy,” the court stated that
“Prometheus’ asserted method claims recite a patent-eligible
application of naturally occurring correlations between metabolite
levels and efficacy or toxicity,”501 because “the steps involve a
particular application of the natural correlations: the treatment of a
specific disease by administering specific drugs and measuring
specific metabolites.”502 According to the court, “[t]he inventive
nature of the claimed methods stems not from preemption of all
use of these natural processes, but from the application of a natural
phenomenon in a series of steps comprising particular methods of
treatment.”503 Again applying the machine-or-transformation test,
the court stated that the “asserted claims are in effect claims to
methods of treatment, which are always transformative when one
of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to eliminate
the effects of an undesired condition.”504 The court then found that
both the administering and determining steps included
transformations, specifically metabolization of the administered
drugs after administration and “manipulation, such as the high
pressure liquid chromatography method specified in several of the
asserted dependent claims or some other modification of the
substances to be measured,”505 that were required to determine
498

Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230
(2010)).
499
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
500
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1354.
501
Id. at 1355.
502
Id.
503
Id.
504
Id. at 1356.
505
Id. at 1357.

C04_PIERCE (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE RISE AND FALL OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY

1/5/2013 2:08 PM

263

levels of the metabolites formed. In both cases, according to the
court, the transformations were “central to the purpose of the
claims,”506 as prescribed by Bilski. As before, the court contrasted
the claimed subject matter with that of Grams in that the methods
of Prometheus were more than “‘merely’ data-gathering steps”
associated with “insignificant extra-solution activity.”507
In other words, in order to find statutory subject matter in
Prometheus’ claims, the court was forced to distinguish Grams’
“data-gathering steps” from Prometheus’ “purpose of treating
disease” and “purpose of assessing the drug’s dosage during the
course of treatment.”508 However, characterizing claimed subject
matter as patent eligible or not on the basis of the purpose
associated with the claimed invention reduces any such analysis to
a matter of semantics; any act, such as collection of data, can
arbitrarily be ascribed to a higher purpose.
Viewed from the standpoint of physical application of
naturally-occurring principle, on the other hand, the subject matter
of both Prometheus and Grams would meet the statutory criteria of
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but neither might pass the
requirement of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, regardless of
whether the testing and determination steps could be held to be
part of Prometheus’ “treatment protocol”509 or “merely an
algorithm combined with a data-gathering step,” as ascribed to
Grams.510 Diagnostic testing, such as was claimed as application
of principle in both Prometheus511 and Grams,512 would have to
include some physical application of principle in order to qualify
as statutory subject matter, and that physical application would
have to be new in order to meet the novelty requirement.
More generally, diagnostic testing is based on some discovered
correlation between a test result and a physiological condition, and
the value of the test is in the ability to isolate a subpopulation
506
507
508
509
510
511
512

Id.
See id. at 1358.
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id. at 1358.
See, e.g., Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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likely to have the physiological condition identified by the claimed
diagnostic method. Diagnostic methods, therefore, quite clearly
qualify as statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and,
further, will at least meet the statutory requirement of novelty if the
claimed method includes a novel physical step. For example, the
claimed diagnostic testing in Metabolite, discussed above,513
included a physical manifestation of naturally-occurring principle,
namely, that of testing for an amount of total homocysteine.514
The novelty associated with this claimed method was the selection
of a subpopulation on whom the test was to be conducted. The
new application of the principle was testing of a subpopulation of
individuals for whom elevated levels of total homocysteine could
generally be correlated with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate, as
discussed by the inventors.515 Conversely, the mere act of drawing
new conclusions from available information would not represent a
physical application of naturally-occurring principle, even if new,
nor would new conclusions drawn from ubiquitous testing
constitute a novel method, even if the testing done was, in fact, a
physical application of naturally-occurring principle, as in Grams,
or even Prometheus.
The Federal Circuit took a comparatively broad view of
statutory qualification of claimed subject matter in Research Corp.
Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.516 The claims of the patent at
issue were directed to methods and machines for imaging that
utilized half-toning masks “designed to produce visually pleasing
dot profiles when thresholded at a number of levels and a
comparator responsive to [a] computer readable memory
device.”517 The court reversed the district court’s holding that the
claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and appeared to accept
the Supreme Court’s invitation in Bilski to develop “other limiting
criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not
inconsistent with its text”518 to determine the eligibility of claimed
513

See supra text accompanying notes 408–15.
See Lab. Corp. of America v. Metabolite Labs., Inc 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
515
See id. at 128.
516
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
517
Id. at 866.
518
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
514
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subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Considering the three
exceptions to eligibility—laws of nature, physical phenomena and
abstract principle—neither the inventors nor the court understood
the claimed process or machine for half-tone imaging to preempt
either laws of nature or physical phenomena.519
As to whether the claimed subject matter amounted to nothing
more than an abstract idea, the court stated that it would “not
presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition that this
disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to
override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”520 The court
viewed the claimed pixel-by-pixel comparison of a digital image
against a blue noise mask of the invention to be “functional and
palpable applications in the field of computer technology”521 that
“are not likely to be so abstract that they would override the
statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”522
As in Prometheus II, where the court held that the claimed
process was “not ‘merely’ data-gathering steps or ‘insignificant
extra-solution activity,’ [but rather] part of treatment regimes for
various diseases using thiopurine drugs,”523 the court relied on
Diehr to resolve the issue of eligibility by selectively
characterizing the claimed invention: “Borrowing from the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Diehr, this court observes that
the patentees here ‘do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of’ halftoning in
computer applications.”524 Correctly, the Federal Circuit also
indicated that, despite qualifying under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
claimed subject matter might not meet the requirements of other

519

See Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869 (“Accordingly, this court reverses the district
court’s summary judgment that the ’310 and ’228 patents do not claim patent-eligible
inventions.”).
520
Id. at 868.
521
Id.
522
Id. at 869.
523
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
524
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187
(1981)).
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sections of the patent statute.525 Here, the court stated that
although a claimed process may “pass the coarse eligibility filter,”
it might still be indefinite or lack an enabling description under 35
U.S.C. § 112.526
The central issue in all questions of patent eligibility is how to
discern impermissible claims to laws of nature, physical
phenomena and abstract ideas from eligible subject matter, since
almost any claimed subject matter can be characterized as eligible
or not, depending upon the limits of the context applied by the
court. For example, in Research Corp. Technologies, the claimed
invention did nothing more than manipulate data to present an
improved image, similar to the “rasterizer” for smoothing a wave
form displayed on an oscilloscope in Alappat,527 and therefore
appeared to reflect the “charade” complained of by Judge Archer
in his dissenting opinion in that case.528 Despite the court’s
acknowledgment that “[s]ection 101 does not permit a court to
reject subject matter categorically because it finds that a claim is
not worthy of a patent,”529 by linking “specific applications or
improvements to technologies in the marketplace”530 to newlyderived judicial tests, such as whether claims are “likely to be so
abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of
the Patent Act” (as was done by the court in Research Corp.
Technologies),531 doctrinal analysis of patent eligibility is brought
just that much closer to the dangers of unpredictability that attend
broad contextual characterizations.
In another example, the Federal Circuit affirmed a
determination of invalidity of claims directed to a “method and
system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between [a]
consumer and a merchant over the Internet” in CyberSource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,532 because “one could mentally perform
525

See id.
See id.
527
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
528
See id. at 1564 (Archer, J., dissenting).
529
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868.
530
Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
531
Id.
532
See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
526
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the fraud detection method.”533 With respect to the “so-called
‘Beauregard claim’” format of a “computer readable medium
containing program instructions,” the court stated that
CyberSource had not “met its burden to demonstrate that [the
claim] is ‘truly drawn to a specific’ computer readable medium,
rather than to the underlying method of credit card fraud
detection.”534 The court did not elaborate on how CyberSource
could establish that the claimed subject matter is “‘truly drawn to a
specific’ computer readable medium,” other than to say that “mere
manipulation or reorganization of dates . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong”535 and “merely claiming a software
implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be
performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy the
machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”536
Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s confirmation in Bilski that
“an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a
known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection,”537 it becomes impossible for courts to identify which
applications are not “made patentable by limiting its use to a
particular technological environment or by adding insignificant
post-solution activity,”538 as the Prometheus II court stated, and
those that are “not so manifestly abstract as to override the
statutory language of § 101” as in Research Corp. Technologies.539
Moreover, if courts remain without a clear understanding of the
types of principles historically embraced by the statutory
applications of “art” or “process,” “machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof,”
the “wide scope,” contemplated by Congress—and recited in

533

Id.
Id. at 1374–75 (emphasis added).
535
Id. at 1375.
536
Id.
537
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 187 (1981)).
538
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1358, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–
92).
539
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
534
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Chakrabarty540—is likely to be tested by claims to subject matter
that are unrelated to any naturally-occurring principle, such as
purely human conceptions including financial systems, forms of
government, religion and other systems that give “people
power . . . (just) over the people.”541
In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
Trademark Office,542 Judge Robert W. Sweet granted summary
judgment invalidating fifteen claims of seven patents543—all
directed to human breast cancer susceptibility genes 1 and 2
(BRCA 1 and BRCA 2), fragments and mutated forms of those
genes, and to methods for their identification and use.544 In
essence, Judge Sweet held that isolated nucleic acids are
unpatentable as products of nature, which are prohibited as outside
the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.545
On appeal,546 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court
decision with respect to all of the claims directed to “isolated”
DNA and all but one of the claims directed to methods of use of

540

See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (“Congress plainly contemplated
that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”).
541
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
542
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
543
See id. at 185–86.
544
See id. at 184–85.
545
See id. at 185. The court stated:
The resolution of these motions is based upon long recognized
principles of molecular biology and genetics: DNA represents the
physical embodiment of biological information, distinct in its
essential characteristics from any other chemical found in nature. It
is concluded that DNA’s existence in an “isolated” form alters neither
this fundamental quality of DNA as it exists in the body nor the
information it encodes. Therefore, the patents at issue directed to
“isolated DNA” containing sequences found in nature are
unsustainable as a matter of law and are deemed unpatentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Similarly, because the claimed comparisons of DNA sequences
are abstract mental processes, they also constitute unpatentable
subject matter under § 101.
Id.
546
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
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DNA.547
With respect to the eligibility of isolated DNA
molecules, the court dismissed a “magic microscope”548 test
proposed by the defendant USPTO, stating that “because such a
microscope could focus in on the claimed isolated BRCA1 or
BRCA2 sequences as they exist in the human body, the claims
covering those sequences are not patent eligible.”549 In contrast,
because the same “imaginary microscope could not focus in vivo
on a cDNA sequence, which is engineered by man to splice
together non-contiguous coding sequences (i.e., exons), claims
covering cDNAs are patent eligible.”550 For the Federal Circuit,
both isolated DNAs and cDNAs are “markedly different—have a
distinctive chemical identity and nature—from molecules that exist
in nature,”551 as required by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty.552
Like cDNAs, “human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a
portion of a native chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated
DNA a distinctive chemical identity from that possessed by native
DNA.”553
The court distinguished the “markedly different characteristics”
of Chakrabarty from the “magic microscope” test by linking patent
eligibility to “reducing a portion of nature to concrete form” which
“may have an entirely different utility”:
Because isolated DNAs, not just cDNAs, have a
markedly different chemical structure compared to
native DNAs, we reject the government’s proposed
“magic microscope” test, as it misunderstands the
547

See id. at 1334.
Id. at 1350.
549
Id.
550
Id.
551
Id. at 1351.
552
See supra text accompanying notes 331–44.
553
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1352. The court dismissed the analogy
made by the district court between “isolation” and “purification.” As stated by the court:
[I]solated DNA is not purified DNA. Purification makes pure what
was the same material, but was previously impure. Although isolated
DNA must be removed from its native cellular and chromosomal
environment, it has also been manipulated chemically so as to
produce a molecule that is markedly different from that which exists
in the body.
Id.
548
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difference between science and invention and fails
to take into account the existence of molecules as
separate chemical entities. . . . It is the difference
between knowledge of nature and reducing a
portion of nature to concrete form, the latter activity
being what the patent laws seek to encourage and
protect. The government’s microscope could focus
in on a claimed portion of any complex molecule,
rendering that claimed portion patent ineligible,
even though that portion never exists as a separate
molecule in the body or anywhere else in nature,
and may have an entirely different utility. That
would discourage innovation.554
By using the word “may,” the court also partitioned patent
eligibility from the statutory requirement that patentable subject
matter must be useful. In other words, the requirement of
“markedly different characteristics” that must be possessed by
patent eligible subject matter does not mandate that patent eligible
subject matter, in fact, be useful, but rather, only that it has the
potential to be useful in ways other than are possible by the form
of that subject matter as it exists in nature.
To make matters worse, the court in Molecular Pathology
seemed to have failed to distinguish patentable from patent
eligible subject matter. Subject matter may be patent eligible and,
at the same time, not be patentable, although it exhibits “markedly
different characteristics relative to its native counterpart, because it
may not, in fact, be “useful” under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Subject
matter also may be patent eligible and yet not be patentable
because it may not meet the requirement of non-obviousness under
35 U.S.C. § 103. The Molecular Pathology court, however,
seemed to miss its own point by stating, in response to an analogy
by the dissent to “snapping a leaf from a tree,”555 that “no one
554

Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1377 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Bryson
stated:
In that respect, extracting a gene is akin to snapping a leaf from a
tree. Like a gene, a leaf has a natural starting and stopping point. It
buds during spring from the same place that it breaks off and falls
555
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could contemplate that snapping a leaf from a tree would be
worthy of a patent, whereas isolating genes to provide useful
diagnostic tools and medicines is surely what the patent laws are
intended to encourage and protect.”556 Ignoring the fact that
isolated leaves are clearly not novel, there is no reason to believe
that those leaves may not have utilities entirely different than those
available while they are still attached. The same may be said for
isolated chemical elements, diamonds and kidneys, which also
were mentioned by the court as not necessarily being “sufficiently
distinctive to make the composition markedly different from the
one that exists in nature.”557 The court here confused patent
eligibility with statutory utility by making patent eligibility at least
potentially contingent upon a demonstration of distinct utility:
[W]e cannot tell on this record whether the changes
are sufficiently distinctive to make the composition
markedly different from the one that exists in
nature. In contrast, a portion of a native DNA
molecule—an isolated DNA—has a markedly
different chemical nature from the native DNA. It
is, therefore, patentable subject matter.558
Again, the proper issue is not whether the subject matter is
“patentable,” but rather whether it is “patent eligible.”
The method claims at issue in Molecular Pathology were
divided by the majority into those directed to “comparing” or
“analyzing” sequences,559 and those directed to “screening
potential cancer therapeutics.”560 The court held that claims
directed to “comparing” or “analyzing” gene sequences were not
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 “because they claim only

during autumn. Yet prematurely plucking the leaf would not turn it
into a human-made invention.
Id.
556

Id. at 1354 (majority opinion).
Id. (“Elemental lithium is the same element whether it is in the earth or isolated; the
diamond is the same lattice of carbon molecules, just with the earth removed; the kidney
is the same kidney; the leaf the same leaf.”).
558
Id. (emphasis added).
559
Id. at 1355.
560
Id. at 1357.
557
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abstract mental processes,”561 and refused to impute to the claims
“transformative steps,” such as “extracting DNA from a human
sample” or “sequencing the BRCA DNA molecule.”562 In contrast
to Prometheus’ claimed methods, the court held that Myriad’s
method claims did not include a “‘determining’ step [that] was
both transformative and central to the purpose of the claims.”563
Instead, the “comparison between the two sequences” of Myriad’s
claims “can be accomplished by mere inspection alone.”564
Myriad’s other method claims, directed to “screening potential
cancer therapies,” were held, on the other hand, to be patent
eligible because the claims included “the steps of (1) ‘growing’
host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the presence
or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, (2) ‘determining’ the
growth rate of the host cells with or without the potential
therapeutic, and (3) ‘comparing’ the growth rate of the host
cells.”565 All of these steps were considered to be “central to the
purpose of the claimed process.”566 The court concluded that the
screening methods of Myriad did not “cover all cells, all
compounds, or all methods of determining the therapeutic effect of
a compound,”567 and therefore were “not so ‘manifestly abstract’
as to claim only a scientific principle, and not a patent eligible
process.”568
As with the court’s earlier analysis, it is not clear why physical
manipulation cannot be imputed to “comparing” or “analyzing”
method steps, but can be considered inherent in the “determining”
method steps of Prometheus and in the “screening” claims of
Myriad. Further, the court did not explain how to distinguish
permissible narrow application of scientific principle from
impermissible “post-solution activity.”

561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568

Id. at 1355.
See id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1358.
Id.
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Judge Moore concurred in part and wrote separately,
distinguishing isolated nucleic acids from genomic DNA on the
basis of the “flexible test” applied by the Supreme Court in Funk
Bros. and Chakrabarty, whereby “an invention which ‘serve[s] the
ends nature originally provided’ is likely unpatentable subject
matter, but an invention that is an ‘enlargement of the range of . . .
utility’ as compared to nature may be patentable.”569 Judge Moore
viewed “short isolated sequences” as having “a variety of
applications and uses in isolation that are new and distinct as
compared to the sequence as it occurs in nature.”570 Judge Moore
believes, “[b]ecause the different chemical structure of the isolated
DNA, which is a product of the intervention of man, leads to a
different and beneficial utility . . . isolated DNA fragments are
patentable subject matter.”571 “Longer strands” represented to
Judge Moore a “much closer case,”572 which depended upon “how
much weight is allocated to the different structure as compared to
the similarity of the function to nature” of those longer
sequences.573 The judge viewed cDNA molecules as having
“markedly different characteristics” than genomic DNA and
naturally occurring RNA, by virtue of lack of introns and
substitution of thiamine for uracil and deoxyribose for ribose,
respectively.574 As a result, “cDNA sequences thus have a

569

Id. at 1359–60 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)).
570
See id. at 1365.
571
Id.
572
Id. at 1366.
573
See id.
574
Id. at 1364. As stated by Judge Moore:
The cDNA claims present the easiest analysis. Although the
plaintiffs (now plaintiff) in the suit argue, and the district court held,
that cDNA falls within the “laws of nature” exception to section 101
patentability, I cannot reconcile this argument with the fact that the
claimed cDNA sequences do not exist in nature. Moreover, since
cDNA has all of the introns removed, and only contains the coding
nucleotides, it can be used to express a protein in a cell which does
not normally produce it. Of course, the claimed isolated cDNA is
inspired by nature—after all, naturally occurring RNA is the template
upon which cDNA is constructed. Because it is used as a template,
however, cDNA has a complementary sequence of nucleotides, and
therefore has a completely different nucleotide sequence than the
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distinctive name, character, and use, with markedly different
chemical characteristics from either the naturally occurring RNA
or any continuous DNA sequence found on the chromosome.”575
Judge Bryson, in a separate opinion, agreed that claims to
BRCA cDNA are patent eligible, but he dissented from the portion
of the majority’s opinion that isolated segments of DNA are
statutory subject matter. Like the “magic microscope” analogy,
Judge Bryson found that there was “no magic to a chemical bond
that requires us to recognize a new product when a chemical bond
is created or broken, but not when other atomic or molecular forces
are altered,” such as when ionic bonds are broken to derive lithium
from its salt.576 As stated by Judge Bryson:
The majority characterizes the question in this case
as turning on the breaking of covalent bonds linking
the BRCA genes to the rest of the DNA in
chromosomes 13 and 17, but its analysis appears to
place patentable weight on the breaking of other
chemical bonds, such as the hydrogen bonds that
are broken when separating DNA from histones
or—in an example unrelated to this case, the ionic
bonds that are broken when lithium is derived from
a salt. It is difficult to see why differences between
types of chemical bonds should matter for
patentability purposes, and I see little support for
such a distinction in the governing precedents.577
Even so, Judge Bryson relied on utility to assess the statutory
eligibility of both cDNA and isolated nucleic acids, finding that
“cDNA has a utility not present in naturally occurring BRCA DNA
and mRNA because cDNA can be attached to a promoter and
inserted into a non-human cell to drive protein expression,”578

RNA. Moreover, DNA has a different chemical structure than RNA,
including a different base (T instead of U, respectively) and sugar
units (deoxyribose instead of ribose, respectively).
Id.
575
576
577
578

Id.
Id. at 1375 (Bryson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 1375 n.3.
Id. at 1379.
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rendering it patent eligible, whereas “Myriad has failed to credibly
identify new uses for the isolated BRCA genes as probes or
primers.”579 Judge Bryson framed Chakrabarty as focusing “on
two things: (1) the similarity in structure between what is claimed
and what is found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between
what is claimed and what is found in nature.”580 For Judge Bryson,
the test of “similarity in structure” could be analogized to
“extracting a slab of marble from the earth [that] does not give rise
to protectable intellectual property rights, but ‘extracting’ a piece
of sculpture from that slab or marble [that] does.”581 Judge Bryson
explicitly linked the test for similarity in structure to that of utility:
One could say, for example, that a baseball bat is
“extracted” or “isolated” from an ash tree, but in
that case the process of “extracting” the baseball bat
necessarily changes the nature, form, and use of the
ash tree and thus results in a manmade manufacture,
not a naturally occurring product. In that setting, a
man has defined the parts that are to be retained and
the parts that are to be discarded. The result of the
process of selection is a product with a function that
is entirely different from that of the raw material
from which it was obtained.582
Judge Bryson also linked statutory eligibility to claim breadth,
stating that “Myriad could easily have claimed more narrowly to
achieve the utility it attaches to segments of cDNA. . . . [It] could
have claimed the tagged segments to achieve probe
functionality.”583 However, the judge did not articulate how so
modifying the claims would have escaped the charge of “mere
post-solution activity.” Further, Judge Bryson’s objection to the
claims appears to be based, at least in part, on policy, in that
“[b]road claims to genetic material present a significant obstacle to

579
580
581
582
583

Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id. at 1377 n.4.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1379.
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the next generation of innovation in genetic medicine—multiplex
tests and whole-genome sequencing.”584
The court could have reconciled the majority opinion with both
Moore’s and Bryson’s separate opinions by acknowledging that all
of the sequences claimed by Myriad—being “isolated” and,
therefore, not naturally occurring—were new physical applications
of naturally occurring principles. Judges Lourie, Moore and
Bryson might have disagreed with respect to whether the subject
matter of individual claims was ultimately patentable, but all could
have agreed—and did, in essence, agree—that the subject matter of
Myriad’s nucleic acid claims, whether of cDNA, or “shorter” or
“longer” sequences, as well as the methods that employed them,
were novel and represented a physical application of naturallyoccurring principle which, therefore, constituted at least one of a
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of the matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof.” Any question of
whether the claimed nucleic acid sequences or the methods that
employed them were judicially-recognized exceptions to statutory
subject matter as being, for example, naturally-occurring
phenomena, could easily have been resolved by simply
recognizing that the claimed sequences did not occur in nature.
The question of utility could have been addressed separately, and
could even have been further parsed into a separate question of
nonobviousness.
In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,585 the
Federal Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court in view of
Bilski upheld the claims of two patents directed to screening a
plurality of immunization schedules and then immunizing subjects
in accordance with the immunization schedule “identified as
[being] a lower risk” than the others,586 while striking down as
patent-ineligible the claims of a third patent which included
immunizing a group according to a schedule and then comparing
the results of that immunization with those of a control group.587
Writing for the court, Judge Newman stated that while the “claims
584
585
586
587

See id. at 1379–80.
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See id. at 1059–60.
See id. at 1067–68.
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of the ’139 and ’739 Patents are directed to a method of lowering
the risk of chronic immune mediated disorder, including the
physical step of immunization on the determined schedule,”588 the
claims of the ’283 Patent simply “states the idea of collecting and
comparing known information.”589
The court stated: “The
distinction between a concrete, physical step of a process claim, as
compared with data gathering or insignificant extra-solution
activity, warrants specific consideration in the context of evolving
technologies, for ‘Congress took [a] permissive approach to patent
eligibility to ensure that “ingenuity would receive a liberal
encouragement.”’”590
In essence, however, the majority, by characterizing one set of
claims as including a “concrete, physical step of a process
claim,”591 and steps of the other set of claims as “data gathering or
insignificant extra-solution activity,”592 denied any significance
relevant to patent-eligibility of the immunization step of the ’283
Patent, leaving only the “comparing” step. The court, therefore,
imposed a novelty analysis on both sets of claims in that the
claimed method of the ’283 Patent would be known, but for the
“comparing” step, while the claimed subject matter of the ’139 and
’739 Patents would be novel by having tailored the scope of
immunization in view of the “comparing” step that preceded it.
The court, in fact, reduced the claimed method of the ’283 Patent
to that “of reading the literature,”593 and distinguished its holding
in Prometheus II by asserting that, whereas “the claims in
Prometheus are for a method of controlling individualized dosages
of a specific drug by measuring its metabolic products in the blood
of individual patients . . . the Classen patents operate on published
information to determine general immunization schedules.”594
Specifically, the court partitioned the two sets of claims in Classen
588

Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
590
Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
76 (H. A. Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854)))).
591
Id.
592
Id.
593
Id. at 1068 n.2.
594
Id.
589
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on the basis of whether the claims included “transformative steps,”
reasoning that “[t]he principles applied in Prometheus support the
patent eligibility of the Classen claims that include such
transformative steps, but are not relevant to claims that require no
more than referring to known information but do not include
immunization in light of that information.”595 The court neglected
to mention that not all of the claims of Prometheus included any
“administration” step.596
Judge Moore dissented from the Classen majority opinion in
that she saw “no distinction between the ’283 claims and the ’139
and ’739 claims,”597 noting that “[t]he ’283 patent claim clearly
and unequivocally requires the physical act of immunization and it
is unfair of the majority to analyze the claim for § 101 purposes as
though it did not have that step.”598 Although recognizing that
both sets of claims include a positive “immunizing” step, Judge
Moore stated that both sets of claims were of “staggering
breadth”599 that presented inherent “preemption issues”600 because
the “claims cover any kind of comparison between any two
schedules, using any drugs in comparing the incidence of any
chronic immune disease.”601 Therefore, in the name of “striking
the balance between protecting inventors and not granting
monopolies over procedures that others would discover by
independent, creative application of general principles,”602 Judge
Moore considered the immunization step of the ’283 Patent to be
“nothing more than a data gathering step necessary to explore the
effects of different immunization schedules,”603 and that of the
’739 Patent to be mere “post-solution activity.”604 Invoking Flook,

595

Id.
See supra notes 427–32 and accompanying text.
597
Classen, 659 F.3d at 1076 (Moore, J., dissenting).
598
Id. at 1077 n.1.
599
Id. at 1076.
600
Id.
601
Id. at 1078.
602
Id. at 1080 (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228
(2010)).
603
Id. at 1079 (Moore, J., dissenting).
604
Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
596
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Judge Moore determined that neither sets of claims were the “kind
of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”605
Despite being a dissenting opinion, Judge Moore’s reasoning
closely paralleled Judge Newman’s majority opinion. Specifically,
both judges discounted the significance of positively claiming
“immunizing” as a distinct step of the claimed methods by
relegating that step to “data gathering” or “post-solution
activity.”606 Also, both Judge Newman and Judge Moore inserted
other statutory requirements as part of their analysis. As discussed
above, Judge Newman, in effect, distinguished the two sets of
claims on the basis of novelty, where comparison of known
immunization schedules lacked novelty, while immunization in
view of such comparison possessed novelty. Judge Moore, on the
other hand, based her analysis on overbreadth, which typically is
part of an enablement analysis under the first paragraph of 35
U.S.C. § 112. Both analyses, however, as in previous cases,
discussed above, could have been made considerably easier by
recognizing that any claim that positively asserts a physical
method step—in this case that of “immunizing”—constitutes a
process under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, therefore, constitutes patent
eligible subject matter. There is no need to go any further with
respect to patent eligibility.
Once the determination has been made that both sets of claims
represent a physical application of naturally-occurring principle,
subsequent analysis of novelty and enablement would have led
Judges Newman and Moore to their respective conclusions, and
may even have compelled them to come to the same conclusion—
namely, that the claims of the ’283 Patent were not novel because
the method of conducting the immunizing step prior to any
comparison was known, and that subsequent comparison did not
yield any benefit absent immunizing a population on the basis of
that comparison, as specified in the claims of the ’139 and ’739
Patents. Similarly, Judges Newman and Moore, by acknowledging
that the claims of the ’139 and ’739 Patents constituted patent
eligible subject matter, may have disagreed with respect to whether
605
606

See id. at 1080 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
See id. at 1079–80; see also supra note 585–95 and accompanying text.
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the subject matter of the claims was impermissibly broad, but they
would do so on the basis of accepted principles of enablement
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 rather than try to apply those principles to
an analysis of patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In another case that tested the limits of patent eligibility,
Ultramerical v. Hulu,607 the Federal Circuit reversed a lower
court’s dismissal of claims as being impermissibly abstract.608 The
claims were directed to a method for distributing copyrighted
products over the Internet by providing copyrighted material to
consumers in exchange for viewing advertisements.609 The
Federal Circuit reaffirmed determinations of subject matter
eligibility as a “threshold check,”610 prerequisite to assessment
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112, and recognized that, while it
is understood that “laws of nature and physical phenomena cannot
be invented,” the issue of “[a]bstractness . . . has presented a
different set of interpretive problems, particularly for the section
101 ‘process’ category.”611 The court characterized the claimed
invention as a “method for monetizing and distributing copyrighted
products over the Internet”612 that extended beyond the “mere idea
that advertising can be used as a form of currency.”613 Rather, the
court held that the claimed subject matter constituted a “practical
application of this idea”614 that consisted of several steps, many of
which would likely “require intricate and complex computer
programming.”615 The degree of “programming complexity
required before a computer-implemented method can be patent
eligible”616 was not defined, nor would the court hold that “use of

607

Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See id. at 1330.
609
Id. at 1324.
610
Id. at 1326 (“More importantly, as § 101 itself expresses, subject matter eligibility is
merely a threshold check; claim patentability ultimately depends on the ‘conditions and
requirement of this title.’”).
611
Id.
612
See id. at 1327.
613
See id. at 1328.
614
Id.
615
Id.
616
Id.
608
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an Internet website to practice such a method is either necessary or
sufficient in every case to satisfy section 101.”617
Rather, the Ultramercial court held that they “simply find the
claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of these
factors.”618 In contrast to CyberSource, where the court held that
CyberSource had not “met its burden to demonstrate that [the
claim] is ‘truly drawn to a specific’ computer readable medium,”619
the court in Ultramercial held that the claims were directed to a
“particular method for collecting revenue from the distribution of
media products over the Internet.”620 Specifically, the court stated
that, “[u]nlike the claims in CyberSource, the claims here require,
among other things, controlled interaction with a consumer via an
Internet website, something far removed from purely mental
steps.”621 As a consequence, quoting Research Corp., the court
held that Ultramercial’s claimed invention was “not ‘so manifestly
abstract as to override the statutory extra interest in section
101.’”622
Again, selectively characterizing a claimed invention and
placing it on a scale of “abstractness”—as was done by the court in
Ultramercial—limits the precedential value of any jurisprudence
assessing patent eligibility. If the criteria for satisfaction of 35
U.S.C. § 101 is reliance on whether any claimed invention is “so
manifestly abstract”623 as to “override the statutory language and
framework of the patent act,”624 then it should be expected that
litigation in this area of the law will increase along with calls for a
bright line test.
Physical application of naturally-occurring principle as a test
for patent eligibility has been before us all along, and failure to
617

Id.
Id.
619
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
620
Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1329.
621
Id. at 1330.
622
Id. (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).
623
Id.
624
Id. at 1328 (quoting Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869).
618
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recognize and strictly apply it is causing confusion that ultimately
will lead to erosion of patent protection as a driving force in
economic development.
In Ultramercial, the exchange of
copyrighted material for advertisement employing computer
software as “currency” clearly lacks physical application of any
naturally-occurring principal. The claimed method is, instead,
purely a function of social leverage, such as the claimed method of
hedging that was repudiated by the Supreme Court in Bilski.625 No
amount of “intricate and complex computer programming,” or
“practical application of this idea,”626 can change the fact that the
claimed subject matter in Ultramercial required no physical steps
and involved no application of naturally-occurring principal.
Even if, as a hypothetical, the claimed subject matter of
Ultramercial did specify some physical application of naturallyoccurring principal, such as making keystrokes, the claimed
subject matter would meet the statutory requirement of a process
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. That same subject matter may or may not
meet the other requirements of the Patent Act of 1952, but would
have to do so within the realm of criteria set forth with respect to
those keystrokes, and not with respect to motivation for making
those keystrokes that are outside the scope of patent eligibility.
Although such easy assessments may be subject to the criticism
that statutory eligibility might simply be a matter of claim-drafting
skill, an increased focus on physical application of naturallyoccurring principal would easily separate patent eligible subject
matter from that which is not, and would allow assessment of
patentability under other sections of the statute.
For example, in the case of Ultramercial, although application
of keystrokes as method steps would cause the claim to meet the
requirements of section 101, the claimed method would not meet
the requirements of section 102 unless the sequence of keystrokes
was novel and, even if the sequence of keystrokes was novel, it
would be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the only basis for
nonobviousness of that sequence would be predicated on the patent
ineligible subject matter of exchange of copyrighted material for
625
626

See supra text accompanying notes 451–90.
Id.
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advertisement. The historical alternative is to consider any such
steps included in the claim to be considered mere post-solution
activity, which would be disqualified from consideration of the
claimed invention as a whole under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, partitioning the analysis as proposed clearly
distinguishes the tests for patent eligibility from patentability.
Regardless of which approach is applied, a decision must be made
as to the scope of patent eligible subject matter. As can be seen,
decisions made in the absence of consideration as to whether the
principle of an invention is an application of a naturally-occurring
principle or one of human social origin—such as finance,
government or religion—and in the absence of considerations as to
whether that claimed invention is a physical application of that
principle, leads to an inextricable difficulties in the predictability
of the outcome of any question regarding eligibility for patent
protection.
III. MAYO V. PROMETHEUS: BEYOND THE ZERO
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.,627 Justice Breyer for the Supreme Court reversed the decision
made by the Federal Circuit on remand. In a 9-0 decision, the
Court recognized that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable,628 but that “to transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of
such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature
while adding the words ‘apply it.’”629 Rather, relying on Flook,
the Court stated that its precedents “insist that a process that
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements
or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent and practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law
itself.”630 As discussed above, the Court in Flook relied upon lack
of “inventive application of principle” to deny patent eligibility to
627
628
629
630

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
See id. at 1292
See id. at 1294.
Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).

C04_PIERCE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2013 2:08 PM

284

[Vol. 23:186

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Flook’s method for calculating an alarm limit.631 Specifically, as
stated by the Court in Flook:
Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101,
not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as
one component, but because once that algorithm is
assumed to be within the prior art, that the
application, considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention. Even though a phenomenon
of nature or mathematical formula may be wellknown, an inventive application of the principle
may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such
a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there
is some other inventive concept in its application.632
According to the Court in Mayo, the question of patent
eligibility did not hinge upon the “machine-or-transformation test,”
despite the fact that it is an “important and useful clue,” that the
Federal Circuit believed “led to the ‘clear and compelling
conclusion . . . that the . . . claims . . . do not encompass laws of
nature or preempt natural correlations.”633 Instead, the Court held
that the question was whether “the patent claims add enough to
their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they
describe to qualify as patent eligible processes that apply natural
laws.”634
The Court then addressed the “administering” step,
“determining” step and “wherein” step of Prometheus’ claims and
found that each of them, individually, was a conventional method
step which, even in combination, “adds nothing to the laws of
nature that is not already present when the steps are considered
separately.”635 Rather, according to the Court, “the three steps
simply tell doctors to gather data from which they may draw an
inference in light of the correlations.”636 The Court compared
631

See supra text accompanying note 297–308.
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
633
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (quoting Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)).
634
Id. at 1297.
635
Id. at 1298.
636
Id.
632

C04_PIERCE (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE RISE AND FALL OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY

1/5/2013 2:08 PM

285

Prometheus’ method with those in Diehr and Flook, stating that
those cases were the “most directly on point,”637 albeit having
opposite conclusions. In particular, the Court held that, whereas in
Diehr the “steps of the process integrated the equation into the
process as a whole”638 and thereby “transformed the process into
an inventive application of the formula,”639 the process in Flook
“did not ‘explain how the variables used in the formula were to be
selected, nor did the [claim] contain any disclosure relating to
chemical processes at work or the means of setting off an alarm or
adjusting the alarm limit,’”640 and, therefore, “the other steps in the
process did not limit the claim to a particular application.”641 As a
result, “there was no ‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application
of the formula.”642 The Court held that the “claim before us
presents a case for patentability that is weaker than the (patent
eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable)
claim in Flook”643 because the “instructions” of the claim “add
nothing specific to the laws of nature other than what is wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in
by those in the field.”644
The Mayo Court also offered other, older cases to support its
conclusions. For example, Neilson v. Harford, an eighteenthcentury English case645 which was directed to introduction of
heated air to a furnace,646 was considered by the Mayo Court to
have been held patentable because the claimed process “included
not only a law of nature but also several unconventional steps
(such as inserting the receptacle, applying heat to the receptacle
externally, and blowing the air to into the furnace)”647 and, thus,

637

Id.
Id.
639
Id. at 1299.
640
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 (1981)).
641
Id.
642
Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
643
Id.
644
Id.
645
See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text.
646
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300 (quoting Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rpt.
1266 (Exch. Div.); 8 M. & W. 806).
647
Id.
638
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“explained how the principal could be implemented in an inventive
way.”648
By way of contrast, the Court recalled how the patent
application in Bilski claimed “an unpatentable abstract idea,”649
namely the “concept of hedging”650 that, like Flook, could not be
saved by limiting that idea to “one field of use or adding token
postsolution components.”651 The Court also linked “post solution
activity” to preemption through Benson by stating that, because the
mathematical formula in Benson “‘had no substantial practical
application except in connection with the digital computer’ . . . the
claim (like the claims before us [in Prometheus]) was overly
broad; it did not differ significantly from a claim that just said
‘apply the algorithm.’”652 The underlying problem for the Court
was the same as that stated in Morse: what if a future inventor
were to “discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance . . .
[that] if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it,
nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this
patentee[?]”653 According to the Mayo Court, these concerns were
also reflected in the decisions to deny patent eligibility under 35
U.S.C. § 101 in Benson, Bilski and Flook. As summarized by the
Court:
[E]ven though rewarding with patents those who
discover new laws of nature and the like might well
encourage their discovery, those laws and
principles, considered generally, are “the basic tools
of scientific and technological work.” And so there
is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their
use will inhibit future innovation premised upon
them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented
process amounts to no more than an instruction to
“apply the natural law,” or otherwise forecloses

648
649
650
651
652
653

Id.
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010)).
Id. (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222).
Id. at 1301 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231).
Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
Id. (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)).
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more future invention than the underlying discovery
could reasonably justify.654
As applied to Prometheus’ claimed subject matter, the Court
stated that “[w]e need not, and do not, now decide whether were
the steps at issue here less conventional, these features of the claim
would prove sufficient to invalidate them.”655
The Court recognized that, “in evaluating the significance of
additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the §
102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap,” however,
§§ 102 and 103 say nothing about treating laws of
nature as if they were part of the prior art when
applying those sections False[and] studiously
ignoring all laws of nature when evaluating patents
under §§ 102 and 103 would ‘make all inventions
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced
to underlying principles of nature which, once
known, make their implementation obvious.”656
These considerations led the Court “to decline the Government’s
invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better
established inquiry under section 101.”657 In essence, the Court
was attempting to “balance”658 the effects of patent protection,
which it considered to be “a two-edged sword,”659 whereby “[o]n
the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary
incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery. On the
other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the flow of
information that might permit, indeed spur, invention . . . .”660
The Supreme Court’s insistence on including an “inventive
concept” or “inventive application” of a law of nature as a criterion
for assessing patent eligibility stems from dual concerns that
“[i]ntuitively, one would suppose that a newly discovered law of

654
655
656
657
658
659
660

Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (1972)).
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1304 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981)).
Id.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id.
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nature is novel,”661 and that, because “§§ 102 and 103 say nothing
about treating laws of nature as if they were part of the prior art
when applying those subsections,”662 the consequence of failing to
require an “inventive concept” as part of the threshold for patent
eligibility of § 101 “would make the ‘law of nature’ exception to §
101 patentability a dead letter.”663 Therefore, according to the
Court, “to shift the patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to these later
sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while
assuming that those sections can do work they are not equipped to
do.”664
However, mandating that a claimed combination of elements
embody an “inventive concept,” threatens to collapse the
requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and
112 into that of patent eligibility by failing to provide any basis for
distinguishing between them.
Alternatively, the failure to
acknowledge that the criteria for novelty, nonobviousness and
enablement are inherent in assessments of “inventive conception”
hopelessly mires patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in a
sliding scale of policy considerations and arbitrary judgments. The
Supreme Court in Mayo expressly articulated the relative nature of
patent eligibility:
But the underlying functional concern here is a
relative one: how much future innovation is
foreclosed relative to the contribution of the
inventor. A patent upon a narrow law of nature
may not inhibit future research as seriously as
would a patent upon Einstein’s law of relativity, but
the creative value of the discovery is also
considerably smaller. And, as we have previously
pointed out, even a narrow law of nature (such as
the one before us) can inhibit future research.665
In view of such language by the Supreme Court, it is
understandable that practitioners and theoreticians would advocate
661
662
663
664
665

Id. at 1304.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1303 (emphasis added).
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that 35 U.S.C. § 101 not be addressed as a “threshold”
consideration preliminary to standards under §§ 102, 103 and 112,
but, rather, to address 35 U.S.C. § 101 as necessary only after
addressing those other considerations.666
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus marks
the demise of any boundary to what may be considered statutory
subject matter, so long as the claimed subject matter can be
“characterized,” to use the Supreme Court’s term,667 in a manner
that appears not to embrace a scope so large as to “inhibit future
research.”668 One consequence of applying only a vague standard
of “inventive conception” and “inventive application” to patent
eligibility, as the Court in Mayo has done, is to free patentable
subject matter from physical application of laws of nature, physical
phenomena and abstract ideas. This is contrary to historical
notions of patent eligibility. Ironically, failure to limit patent
eligibility to physical applications of naturally-occurring
phenomena and abstract principles obscures the “bright-line
prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathematical
formulas and the like” noted by the Court,669 and inevitability will
result in the descent of our patent regime.
CONCLUSION
Although the patent system in the United States has evolved
considerably since the Patent Act of 1790, and although it has
always been distinct from the English patent custom from which it
was derived, there are certain fundamental principles that remain
manifest, albeit sometimes rather cryptically, in our current
jurisprudence. One of these is the criterion of subject matter
eligibility for patent protection. The term “useful art” in Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, under the meaning of that
666

See, e.g., supra note 17.
132 S. Ct. at 1299. In distinguishing Flook from Diehr, the Court stated: “The
Court, as in Diehr, pointed out that the basic mathematical equation, like a law of nature,
was not patentable. But it characterized the claimed process as doing nothing other than
‘provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for computing an updated alarm limit.’” Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978)).
668
Id. at 1303.
669
Id.
667
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term at the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, has been
understood to be limited to physical applications of naturallyoccurring principle. Exceptions to statutory classes of patent
eligible subject matter had their basis in lack of novelty, and barred
patent protection for subject matter that would preempt, without
limit, exclusive rights to laws of nature, physical phenomena and
abstract ideas.
Advancements in technology have clearly eclipsed the
imaginations of the Founders as undoubtedly they presumed it
would. However, the space they created within the Constitution
“by securing for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right
to their . . . discoveries,”670 as applied by the various patent acts
dating from 1790, and as interpreted by the courts, has until
recently exhibited remarkable consistency in mandating an
underlying physical manifestation of naturally-occurring principle.
Many tests have evolved over the last two hundred years to attempt
to adapt this broad concept to new technologies for which patent
protection is sought.
However, if these tests obscure a
fundamental requirement of some sort of physical application of
naturally-occurring principle by employing some undefined
terminology or open policy, such as “inventive concept,”
“inventive application,” or by requiring elements that are “less than
conventional,” as in Mayo v. Prometheus, the resulting
unpredictability will undermine the patent system as we know it
and may, ultimately, lead to diminished reliance on patents as a
means for advancement of our societal economic development.

670

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

